Tino Rangatiratanga and localism

My piece for the Saturday papers weekend before last, and now ungated here, went back to a theme that Richard Harman had noticed in the Waitangi speeches. 

Minister Shane Jones argued fuller debate on the meaning of Tino Rangatiratanga is inevitable, saying, “There is a deep, committed view from Pita Tipene and others that article two is a charter for iwi sovereignty. And at some point in time, that debate is going to be flushed out. It’s not a conception that I share. I conceive it to be more localised.”

Prime Minister Luxon said, “We are a party and particularly a government that is actually about making sure there is localism and devolution and that those closest to the problem should solve the problems. …Our fundamental belief is localism and devolution. We do not believe in centralization and control through Wellington.”

It is certainly not for a Canadian economist to weigh in on Treaty interpretation. I have neither the standing nor the understanding.

But one bit of the Canadian experience might be interesting.

Canada’s overall policies regarding its First Nations have been abysmal. But Canada’s First Nations nevertheless have some rights comparable to Canadian municipalities.

Basically, Canada's First Nations Band Councils have powers on reserves comparable to municipalities, except under federal rather than provincial jurisdiction. 

Decades ago, Manny Jules did the work to get band councils the authority to levy property taxes on reserve to fund band council activities. 

And look at this section of the Indian Act - I've bolded the interesting bits.

81 (1) The council of a band may make by-laws not inconsistent with this Act or with any regulation made by the Governor in Council or the Minister, for any or all of the following purposes, namely,

(a) to provide for the health of residents on the reserve and to prevent the spreading of contagious and infectious diseases;

(b) the regulation of traffic;

(c) the observance of law and order;

(d) the prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances;

(e) the protection against and prevention of trespass by cattle and other domestic animals, the establishment of pounds, the appointment of pound-keepers, the regulation of their duties and the provision for fees and charges for their services;

(f) the construction and maintenance of watercourses, roads, bridges, ditches, fences and other local works;

(g) the dividing of the reserve or a portion thereof into zones and the prohibition of the construction or maintenance of any class of buildings or the carrying on of any class of business, trade or calling in any zone;

(h) the regulation of the construction, repair and use of buildings, whether owned by the band or by individual members of the band;

(i) the survey and allotment of reserve lands among the members of the band and the establishment of a register of Certificates of Possession and Certificates of Occupation relating to allotments and the setting apart of reserve lands for common use, if authority therefor has been granted under section 60;

(j) the destruction and control of noxious weeds;

(k) the regulation of bee-keeping and poultry raising;

(l) the construction and regulation of the use of public wells, cisterns, reservoirs and other water supplies;

(m) the control or prohibition of public games, sports, races, athletic contests and other amusements;

(n) the regulation of the conduct and activities of hawkers, peddlers or others who enter the reserve to buy, sell or otherwise deal in wares or merchandise;

(o) the preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing animals, fish and other game on the reserve;

(p) the removal and punishment of persons trespassing on the reserve or frequenting the reserve for prohibited purposes;

(p.1) the residence of band members and other persons on the reserve;

(p.2) to provide for the rights of spouses or common-law partners and children who reside with members of the band on the reserve with respect to any matter in relation to which the council may make by-laws in respect of members of the band;

(p.3) to authorize the Minister to make payments out of capital or revenue moneys to persons whose names were deleted from the Band List of the band;

(p.4) to bring subsection 10(3) or 64.1(2) into effect in respect of the band;

(q) with respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to the exercise of powers under this section; and

(r) the imposition on summary conviction of a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty days, or both, for violation of a by-law made under this section.

It is fun to think about what could happen here if iwi had similar authority over building and development on iwi-held land, or Māori land more generally. 

For further fun, look at the 250 page services agreement between Vancouver City and the Squamish First Nation for the Sen̓áḵw development. That development is on Reserve land right next door to downtown Vancouver. 

It's very typical for Kiwi bureaucrats, or bureaucrat-adjacent types, to find the first hurdle that might cause an issue and just give up. Well, here's 250 pages of legal text working through difficulties and finding solutions. 

Back to the column.

A First Nations Band has autonomy over the Band’s land.

It isn’t mere parchment. The listed rights have consequences.

When Sḵwx̱wú7mesh Úxwumixw, the Squamish Nation, finally had five hectares of their land returned to them near downtown Vancouver, the Band had authority over that land. Not the city.

Vancouver has a housing shortage. And Sḵwx̱wú7mesh Úxwumixw wanted to build.

In Auckland, Section H27 of Auckland’s Unitary Plan sets out the Special Purpose - Māori Purpose Zone. A Marae is prescribed by H27.6.2 to be no more than 10 metres in height; height of buildings in relation to boundaries is prescribed by H27.6.3, and even the location of rainwater tanks is prescribed by H27.6.9.

Even if every one of those sections enjoyed the full agreement of every hapū when the rules were written, if a hapū’s needs changed over time, council would have to agree to any change. And City Council issues the consents.

Meanwhile, the Squamish Nation’s website describing the Sen̓áḵw development explains that “Sen̓áḵw is not part of the City of Vancouver, and is not subject to the City's typical development approval process.”

It appears that, in practice, collaboration with Vancouver City has been required in order to effect interconnection to water networks. But bargaining over such things is a bit different when the Band has real autonomy over its own lands.

The service agreement goes well beyond water of course. The Band Council levies a property tax on Sen̓áḵw to pay Vancouver for other services that Sen̓áḵw residents will enjoy. This stuff can be worked out. 

Localist approaches can be more responsive to local needs.

In 2015, the New Zealand Initiative put up a report on devolution. We argued that, if a local community saw central government’s regulations or policies as being unfit for local purposes, they should be able to negotiate their own carve-out. If the policy experiment proved successful, others could take it up. If it failed, the experiment would have been relatively small. Bespoke devolution options can make more sense where councils vary widely in capacity.

But nothing in that report needed to imply that local or regional councils are the only voices of local community. Devolution to iwi or hapū could also fit within the framework.

New Zealand has a housing shortage. Council zoning and consenting rules have obviously been part of the problem.

Devolving zoning, consenting, and rating authority over iwi-held land to iwi wishing that authority may be a longshot. And it would take a lot of work.

But it seems worth thinking about.

I have no expertise or experience in arguments around Treaty interpretation.

I just find it very hard to believe that iwi leaders signing onto the Treaty believed their descendants would wind up needing to beg a bureaucrat’s permission to build houses on their own land.