You can register here for the lecture scheduled for 5.30, Monday 1 April, in the Undercroft. Canterbury's blurb:
The growth of online electronic commerce and markets is attributed not only to their ease of use but also to the fact that they provide reputation and feedback systems that help create trust. Recent research has exposed, however, that feedback systems are biased, suffer from “grade inflation”, and do not clearly differentiate between higher and lower quality sellers. This lecture highlights recent research that addresses these concerns and presents ways to increase the effectiveness of online reputation systems and markets.Tadelis spent time both at Amazon and at eBay's research lab. His bio at Berkeley explains why you might want to fly out to Christchurch for this one, if you're in the industry here in NZ:
These days my research primarily revolves around e-commerce and the economics of the internet. During the 2016-2017 academic year I was on leave at Amazon, where I applied economic research tools to a variety of product and business applications, working with technologists, computer and ML scientists, and business leaders. During the 2011-2013 academic years I was on leave at eBay research labs, where I hired and led a team of research economists who focused on the economics of e-commerce, with particular attention to creating better matches of buyers and sellers, reducing market frictions by increasing trust and safety in eBay's marketplace, understanding the underlying value of different advertising and marketing strategies, and exploring the market benefits of different pricing structures. Aside from the economics of e-commerce, my main fields of interest are the economics of incentives and organizations, industrial organization, and microeconomics. Some of my past research aspired to advance our understanding of the roles played by two central institutions---firms and contractual agreements---and how these institutions facilitate the creation of value. Within this broader framework, I explored firm reputation as a valuable, tradable asset; the effects of contract design and organizational form on firm behavior with applications to outsourcing and privatization; public and private sector procurement and award mechanisms; and the determinants of trust.Some of his relevant papers and working papers:
- Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
- Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay
- Two-Sided e-commerce Marketplaces and the Future of Retailing
- Buying Reputation as a Signal of Quality: Evidence from an Online Marketplace
- The Limits of Reputation in Platform Markets: An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment
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