Canada stepping up

The Wall Street Journal had an excellent two-parter on Mark Carney's handling of a rather difficult situation: a century-long ally and decades-long free-trade partner threatening to invade and annex your territory, and threatening to nullify the treaty that settled the border. 

Part One (ungated) goes through Europe's slow realisation of the nature of the Trump administration.

Part Two (ungated) explains how Carney helped Europe realise the situation that we are all now in. 

His prescription in large part would lay in Europe, where Carney, a former Bank of England governor, had made his past and now saw Canada’s future. The Canadian banker who never before held elected office would emerge as an unexpected central figure in a high-stakes project to reshape the economic and military community known as the West.

Since World War II the alliance had worked like a wheel: The U.S. as the indispensable hub and the rest as spokes. Carney argued that Canada and Europe would have to build an alternative model, a “dense web of connections” that wouldn’t overly depend on any single country. His approach contrasted to that of another influential leader, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who was encouraging Europe to double down on its relationship with Trump—whatever it took to keep America from abandoning the alliance.  

They represented opposing poles of a years-old debate coming to a boil in Europe, with the U.K., like Rutte, betting heavily on its special relationship with Washington. France, conversely, was eager to build up Europe’s own sovereign defense base and technology, from quantum computing to AI systems held outside America. Carney would try to sway the outcome, without provoking the superpower that imports three-quarters of Canada’s goods.

In effect, a push to make Canada America’s 51st state had lighted a fuse of unintended consequences that would play out far beyond North America, as overseas allies asked themselves whether the U.S.-led alliance could truly last.

The Wall Street Journal spoke to heads of government, their ministers and top aides to reconstruct the closed-door meetings where the alliance began to splinter. The Journal was able to review detailed notes taken by some participants. This is the second in a two-part series revealing the contents of deliberations among America’s allies over how they might salvage their alliance—or prepare for its unraveling.

Matt Gurney and Jen Gerson's discussion at The Line is also worthwhile. 

It does make me a bit nervous about this, from the Politik newsletter:

Last year’s ASEAN Summit underscored the enduring limitations of ASEAN’s collective approach to the South China Sea.

Most member states issued cautious statements and avoided directly addressing recent developments, including China’s declaration of a nature reserve at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, its deployment of buoys, and its continued ramming and use of water cannons against Philippine vessels.

As the 2025 chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reiterated that disputes should be resolved within ASEAN and warned that the involvement of “outside forces” would only heighten tensions.

While Philippine President Marcos publicly agreed with this, his administration continues to pursue partnerships beyond the bloc to deter further Chinese escalation at sea.

Those partnerships are led by the United States.

Thus, New Zealand had a choice: did it side with ASEAN or the US? Clearly, it sided with the US.

The move appears to be part of an orchestrated effort by New Zealand to strengthen its alliances with countries that are seeking to build up their resistance to China.

 

Conference roundup

My column at Newsroom last week gave a roundup of the sessions I attended at the NZAE meetings where the results might be of interest to a broader audience. 

It's ungated now, so folks can catch it there. Along with the usual band of sad old grouchy leftists in the comments section who hate economics and economists. 

I think this was my favourite of all the sessions - but that'll largely be because of my own particular interests. I didn't name the presenter or the shop that did the work as they seemed to want to hold that back until the work is finally ready for public release. But credit really is due. 

There was a superb presentation on problems in cost-benefit assessment, or rather in not using it, when deciding on major projects. Here we can consider ourselves lucky not at the outcome, but that someone is checking.

Economists prefer to rely on cost-benefit analysis when assessing projects – CBA. Some others like to use what’s called Multi-Criteria Analysis – MCA. On that latter kind of assessments, projects get scored across a variety of categories.

Cost-benefit assessment tries to put a monetary value on all kinds of different costs and benefits – some of which are harder than others to turn into dollars and cents. But Treasury maintains a comprehensive spreadsheet (called CBAx) listing the costs and benefits of many things, all of which then provide a standardised basis for assessment.

Multi-Criteria Analysis does not try to do that at all. Instead, a project gets a score within each category, the categories are weighted by their perceived importance, and the project gets an overall grade.

Suppose that you wanted the government to adopt your project proposal, and you knew it didn’t do well on a value-for-money basis. It would have a tough time under CBA. But under MCA, there’s a neat trick. If you add more categories for assessment, the weighting on cost declines automatically. If cost is one of two categories, each category gets 50 percent weighting. If cost is one of 10 categories, then the project’s poor ranking on cost can be outweighed by whatever other categories are added in.

Of course it is possible to require cost to have a high weighting. But it’s rarely done. And then we wind up being surprised by all of the expensive projects that get approved. Cost-benefit assessment is underrated – or, at least, MCA should require that rankings on cost carry a lot of weight. In the assessment exercise described, fewer than 5 percent of evaluated project proposals had a robust cost-benefit assessment.

I am very glad this work is being done, and I expect to provide a more detailed column when the authors are ready to release it into the wild.

In questions after the session, I noted that I've seen a few cases where boosters have tried to claim that their clearly-infrastructure proposal is really a social-type investment warranting Treasury's preferential 2% discount rate. I was annoyed that Treasury seemed utterly indifferent to that risk when they put up their proposal, and hoped that it didn't turn out as badly as I feared. 

The presenter noted that there'd been a full slide on that issue that had been pulled so they wouldn't blow out the time constraint for the session. It is a real and bad issue. As expected. And something that prior better versions of Treasury would have been alert to. 

Pronatal policies

The Institute for Family Studies puts up a pro-natal proposal that I'd not seen before.

Most of the literature I've seen on baby bonuses suggests that the amount on offer would have to be hefty to have substantive effects. This version could harness a bit of loss aversion:

President Trump launched a small savings account seeded with $1,000 to give emerging adults a leg up in his “Trump Accounts,” passed in the One Big Beautiful Bill. The Heritage Foundation has proposed a larger investment intended to mature upon marriage. These ideas are good starts. But the most complete proposal in this regard is a recent proposal in Finland called Vauvasampo. Adapted for the American case, this proposal is simple: every child born as a U.S. citizen in 2026 or any future year would have some amount of money, perhaps $15,000, invested in their name, which we call “American Birthday Accounts,” in honor of our 250th year of independence. 

Beneficiaries could not touch these accounts until they have a child; that is, until they are the legal and custodial parent of a related child born in the United States or under U.S. jurisdiction abroad, and coresiding with that child or else deployed on U.S. government business. At the first birth (or, if preferable to avoid risks of early child abandonment, at the child’s 1st birthday, if still coresident and full custodial), they would gain access to, say, 50% of their account’s value, and the residual 50% would continue growing. At the second birth, 75% of the fund’s remaining value at that time could be claimed. At a third birth, all remaining funds can be claimed. Assuming funds are invested in something like a mutual fund, a $15,000 investment could easily lead to a married couple receiving a baby bonus worth $100,000 for a first birth, with smaller additional payments for subsequent births. Recipients could be permitted to cash out their benefit over multiple years if they preferred, and any new funds gained through subsequent births would be added to this continuing fund. 

This baby bonus money could be counted as income, which means that part of its cost would be directly recouped through interactions with means tested programs and income taxes: beneficiary families at both very low and very high incomes would receive smaller after-tax-and-benefit returns. All families of any income would be eligible, but in practice the real benefits would be most generous for middle-income married families, subsidizing fertility the most for working- and middle-class families. Because only children born in the U.S. would be eligible for the investment, concerns about subsidies for children of immigrants would also be alleviated: it would be essentially a subsidy only for U.S.-born individuals to have their own children. Because married couples would be eligible for each parent’s baby bonus, the benefit would effectively double for married couples. To avoid creating subsidies for teen pregnancy, fund accessibility could be set aside until parents reach an appropriate age (perhaps 21 for a first birth, and a slightly higher age for subsequent births). 

Bang-for-buck, American Birthday Accounts are the single best way to get more babies born in stable families than almost any other policy imaginable. In the long run, since many individuals will have fewer than 3 children (and many will be childless, thus leaving many funds unclaimed), those unused funds can be reinvested in the program to create a rolling national family trust fund, which would render the program zero-cost to taxpayers after the first eligible generation had completed their childbearing. Even without that reinvestment, the budgetary cost for an investment of $15,000 to $20,000 per child would be between $45 and $80 billion per year. For comparison, U.S. public schools spent just under $19,000 per year per student in 2021, so this program amounts to the public investing just one year of schooling worth of public resources into children’s future family life. 

Lyman Stone describes the work at the NYT, ungated here.  

Refugee sponsorship

About a decade ago, Canada's Counsellor for Immigration at the High Commission in Canberra came to Wellington to explain how Canada's refugee sponsorship programme works. 

His discussion of it at The Initiative's event is here. 

The basic deal: whenever communities can get together to raise the funds necessary to support a refugee's start, Canada will open the door to another refugee. Outcomes have been very good - or, at least, sponsored refugees have better outcomes than those arriving through the government's quota.

The previous Labour government here set up a trial programme. And it's now being made permanent. 

The Government has announced the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship (CORS) programme will become a permanent part of New Zealand’s refugee resettlement system.

Associate Minister of Immigration, Casey Costello said the trial of the CORS programme shows it can deliver strong outcomes for refugees in employment, housing, education, and community connection.

“Making it permanent means we can build on the skills, partnerships and knowledge developed through the pilot. This is a positive step and provides a programme that we know works,” Ms Costello says.

The permanent CORS programme will begin 1 July, with organisations able to apply to become approved community sponsors from that date. The introduction of the programme will be scaled, with 50 places available in the first year.

But there are a couple of substantial differences as compared to Canada's regime. Hopefully New Zealand's can evolve towards Canada's in time.

Canada has a high nominal cap on the number of allowed sponsored refugees. 

New Zealand will cap the number at 200.  

Canada's sponsored route sits on top of the government's route. However many refugees the Canadian government is prepared to support, communities can fundraise to support more. Those sponsored refugees are additional. 

New Zealand's will be subtractive. The total number is capped, so whenever a community gets together to sponsor a refugee, one will come through that channel - with no effect on the numbers allowed to come here. 

CORS will be delivered alongside New Zealand’s Refugee Quota Programme, maintaining an overall number of refugee resettlement places available at 1,500. Places will be progressively allocated to the community sponsorship pathway as it scales up, with the Quota Programme adjusting accordingly. This allows CORS to be funded from within existing baselines.

The Refugee Quota Programme will remain New Zealand’s primary humanitarian pathway, and any allocated CORS places that are not taken will return to the Quota Programme. 

“In the current environment, this is the best way to ensure a programme that we know works well can continue into the future,” Ms Costello says.

“The Government remains firmly committed to an overall resettlement intake of 1,500 people per year. New Zealand currently takes the third largest number of UNHCR mandated refugees internationally, behind Canada and Australia.” 

If the concern is resourcing, because the government covers some of the cost in a refugee's travel here, it could make more sense to increase the amount of funding that a community group must raise so it covers the total cost, and then allow it to be additional to the government's quota. 

During the Syrian refugee crisis, Canadian communities could work together to help support more arrivals while Kiwis instead had to lobby the government to increase the quota. I'd hoped that the sponsorship regime could provide flexibility that the government's quota can't. It will not do that job under this setup.