Friday, 31 January 2014

Elitist teasers

I started reading Arts & Letters Daily when I was in grad school. When I moved to Christchurch, I got to meet Denis Dutton, the man behind the pithy one-line teasers that drew me into the web of literate conversation.

When his health was fading, I helped him out a bit with material and wrote a couple of teasers. 

Dutton was BuzzFeed before there was Buzzfeed. But a version that piques intellectual interest rather than the mawkish awfulness that now populates the bottom-trawling footers of news sites.

The difference between BuzzFeed and ALD is why I'm an elitist. Pity the fool who wouldn't be tempted by this kind of clickbait:
ACT ONE: A street in Cambridgeham. Most Exalted Professor, freshly returned from the Land of the Asian Khan, rattles the door of his keep. Enter a WENCH: “Alarum! A Thief!”... more»
General knowledge, from capital cities to key dates, has long been a marker of an educated mind. Now every dope can Google facts... more»
Junk anti-consumerism. Even the most fashion-conscious teenager is less obsessed with consumption than today’s critics of the open market... more»
Would for a world in which ALD teasers could generate as much traffic as Buzzfeed does. Don't hate Buzzfeed for what it is. The problem is much worse than that. Buzzfeed wouldn't exist if a substantial portion of the population weren't wired to hit those buttons. Despair of that instead.

When you're sick of Buzzfeed, head back to ALD. Much there yet abides under Evan Goldstein's careful editorship. In today's edition:
Polarized by political and cultural sensibilities, Americans are a fractious bunch. But one thing they can agree on: the apocalypse... more» 
Other fun ones:
Got civilization? Europe's longtime cultural dominance is due in no small part to a genetic mutation that mitigated lactose intolerance... more»
Dickens as dad. He bestowed on his children grand baptismal names and great expectations. He experienced only disappointment... more»
When intellectuals attack. F.R. Leavis’s assault on C.P. Snow was either an ad hominem travesty or a masterwork of cultural criticism... more»
First came the spiritualists, then the Oneidists, suffragists, abolitionists, Mormons. What was it about upstate New York in the mid-19th century?... more»
Every aspect of higher education has been corrupted by monopolies, cartels, and other predators. A scandal, sure, but so predictable... more»
The epics of Homer, the poems of Sappho, the tragedies of Sophocles were all, originally, set to music. What did they sound like?... more»
Go on. You know you want to.  

Drinking Ed.

In the latest ODT, Jennie Connor makes a series of interesting claims.

Let's take them in turn.
She says ''education and persuasion strategies'' are popular with policymakers, governments and the public ''because it seems to make sense''.

''The problem with them - they don't work. There's no evidence that they work.''

And, that, she says, is an ''international consensus'', based on research done on thousands of educational programmes.
I've certainly not read thousands of studies on educational programmes around alcohol. I've seen meta-analyses that include about thirty. Things like D.A.R.E. seem pretty useless.

But some other programmes seem reasonably effective, depending on what your desired outcome is. In colleges, it's often been pretty effective to simply put up posters advising students of what the actual drinking rates are. Social norms are often set by the visible extroverted drunks. Simply telling people things like "Most (81 percent) of Montana college students have four or fewer alcoholic drinks each week" can let people adjust their consumption to meet the actual norm rather than the perceived one. Where people base their own behaviour on their perception of social norms, and where they think it's pretty normal to get hammered regularly (rather than relatively rare), just telling them the actual stats on their classmates' alcohol (or tobacco, or drug) consumption can help ground social norms in actual moderate behaviour. Now, if your goal is to eradicate drinking, this will hardly work. But these kinds of interventions seem to work to reduce harmful drinking habits.

Alan Berkowitz writes on this "social norm" approach:
Perkins and Craig (2002) conducted the most thorough and comprehensive evaluation of a social norms marketing campaign. Their intervention combined a standard poster campaign with electronic media, an interactive web site, class projects that developed parts of the campaign, and teacher training for curriculum infusion. It was begun in 1996 at a college with higher than average alcohol use. Multiple evaluations that were conducted determined that: 1) increases in drinking that normally occur during the freshman year were reduced by 21%; 2) previous weeks’ high risk drinking decreased from 56% to 46%; and 3) alcohol-related arrests decreased each year over a four-year time period. Corresponding reductions were also found in misperceptions of use, heavy drinking at a party, and negative consequences associated with alcohol use. Surveys conducted at three time periods over a five-year period indicate successive linear decreases in all of these measures over time. 
I'm not sure I'd be as quick as Connor to write off the effectiveness of some of these kinds of programmes. Sure, D.A.R.E. sucks. But posters in college dorms reminding folks that it isn't normal to get drunk all the time, where they're grounded in actual data about those students' peers, seem at least somewhat effective.

Back to Connor:
Prof Connor says educational programmes raise awareness there is a problem with alcohol.

''And they have no effect on behaviour.

''Even some of the programmes that show a modest amount of effect on drinking in the short term, it doesn't last.

''There is no evidence of any sort of education programme that produces a real change in hazardous drinking or harm.''

Prof Connor says education does not work for smoking, eating fast food or any kind of health behaviour.
The norms campaigns above, or at least according to Berkowitz, seemed to have continued effectiveness. These kinds of programmes were also recommended in Sunstein and Thaler's "Nudge".

It also depends a lot on what your effectiveness measure is. Suppose that you observe that, when we give people a lot of information about the number of calories in different items at a fast food restaurant, they don't change their consumption much. An economist might then conclude that it's less likely that "lack of information" were driving consumption choices and would reckon it more likely that the observed consumption decisions reflected reasonable consumer preferences. A public health person might conclude that the programme failed and that stronger measures were needed.

Interestingly, recent work also suggests a reasonable turnaround in Americans' food consumption behaviours, and especially away from calories-from-beverages, chalking it up to public health efforts.

Connor continues:
Prof Connor believes if New Zealand is to reduce the harm done by alcohol then it needs regulations to rein in the alcohol industry - things like a reduction in the number of pubs and earlier closing times for on-licences.

''There is plenty of good evidence that if you close on-licences, pubs and stuff, earlier, you have less crime.''
Boy, I wish that these kinds of articles would link to sources. I can't fault Connor for that though. You have to be awfully careful in work looking at pub locations and crime. Pubs want to locate where there's reasonable night-life; those places would attract crime even absent the pub. And, if pubs are closing because nightlife's moved on to other venues, you could get reverse causality. But I've not yet looked closely at this literature.
And she is an advocate of more tax on alcohol to make it more expensive. ''There's absolutely no doubt, putting the price up reduces consumption, reduces the consumption even of the very heavy entrenched drinkers, it certainly reduces consumption by young people, it reduces the amount of physical health harm and it reduces the amount of violence and disorder.

''And it doesn't cost much to do.''
This one, I know about. And Connor's dead wrong. Alcohol demand is relatively price insensitive. What price sensitivity there is mostly comes from light-to-moderate drinkers. Heavy drinkers don't much respond to price measures; binge drinking doesn't much respond to price measures. If you raised petrol excise to $50/litre, you'd probably cut down on drag racing, but you'd devastate normal commuting. This is the kind of policy Connor here is proposing, and that she doesn't think costs very much. If you count the harms done to moderate consumers, it costs a lot.
Prof Connor believes the generation that liberalised alcohol laws has let the country's young people down.

''The chronic heavy drinkers are all older. These are the people young people are learning from. They see it's OK to drink large quantities of alcohol.

...''When you liberalise the law, people just drink more. They drink heavily and in a very messy way.''

While I agree that the baby boomers have a lot to answer for, especially around housing market regulation, it is simply wrong to suggest that liberalisation of the alcohol laws made things worse here. A chart from a few years ago, originally from Kiwiblog:


There was a sharp increase in total alcohol consumption per capita from 1970 through the early 1980s, then a sharp drop from 1985 through the late 1990s, and a pretty stagnant trend since then. I expect that much of the rise from 1970 through 1985 was women catching up to men's drinking habits. Darned hard to see any negative effect of alcohol liberalisation in the aggregate consumption data. And most other "bad stuff" trends seem to be dropping too. The drop in the alcohol purchase age from 20 to 18 didn't worsen anything of consequence either.

And I worry about the continued denigration of supermarket alcohol availability. A lot of craft brewers would have a much harder time getting product out to consumers were it not for friendly stockists at the local New World and Fresh Choice supermarkets.

I agree with Connor on one bit, though. She says that you shouldn't let your kids see you drunk. I agree. It's one of the reasons we bring the kids with us to the University Staff Club every Friday night. They there can see, regularly, how decent people interact with alcohol: moderate normal social consumption among friends, with kids running around and playing in the gardens. I hope that they grow up to follow that example.

Thursday, 30 January 2014

Auckland Uber

So Uber's looking to expand into Auckland. This is great news.

I had thought that regulations around taxicabs might stop them.

Any taxicab in New Zealand must have 24-hour dispatch and must have a suitable camera monitoring device. Any vehicle that can be flagged down counts as a taxi. Uber's dispatch system might count as suitable 24-hour dispatch support, but the camera installation would block any part-time folks from entering the market with their own vehicles.

However, there's also a very nice "Private Hire" designation. Those vehicles cannot accept casual hires but must instead be booked in advance. I expect that Uber's booking service would meet this requirement, but I am not a lawyer. The driver may not use a taxi meter to determine the fare - again, Uber should be fine. Drivers would need to put up a driver identification card, and Uber would be responsible for ensuring that these meet spec. Sections 3 and 6 of the Code would apply.

I expect that drivers would have to get a P endorsement on their drivers' licences, which requires taking a course and passing a test. So current cabbies could flip to Uber in their own cars, retired cabbies who still have the P endorsement could start up again, and others willing to sit the test could come into the market.

I also expect the Taxicab Federation to have a fit and demand that Uber come under taxi licensing.

Auckland Uber, after all.

Wednesday, 29 January 2014

Petrol tax:speeding :: alcohol tax:binge drinking

If you want to reduce binge drinking, excise tax rates are a remarkably blunt instrument. We don't use petrol taxes to curb drag racing; we shouldn't think that alcohol excise is a great solution to binge drinking.

I'd posted last year on a nice Australian study by Byrnes et al who found that tax increases did a lot to curb light and moderate drinkers' consumption, but did little to stop binge drinkers. Heavy drinkers did respond to the price hikes, but only by cutting back on their light drinking days. They still binged on the weekends.

Was that study representative? A new metastudy by Jon Nelson says so. Jon went through 56 papers examining the effects of alcohol taxes or prices on binge drinking and found very little effect. He writes:
A large body of evidence now indicates that binge drinkers are not highly-responsive to increased prices or taxes, and may not respond at all. Nonresponsiveness holds generally for younger and older drinkers and for male and female binge drinkers alike. Increased alcohol prices or taxes are unlikely to be effective as a means to reduce binge drinking, regardless of gender or age group.
Nelson notes that a lot of alcohol policy papers suggest prices as effective mechanism against binge drinking. Livingston's review, quoted by Nelson, looks a lot like the Law Commission's review of the effect of prices on heavy drinkers from a couple of years ago. Nelson on Livingston:
A recent review by Livingston (2013, p. 374) argues that “many critics of alcohol taxation suggest that it fails to affect problematic drinkers [but] this is not supported by the literature, with studies showing that both young people and heavy drinkers respond to price changes.” A Global Strategy report of the World Health Organization (2010, p. 16) states that “. . . increasing the price of alcoholic beverages is one of the most effective interventions to reduce harmful use of alcohol.” These and similar statements tend to be based on limited literature reviews or econometric studies that focus on population-level demand, and not alcohol demands by individual binge drinkers and other heavy/excessive drinkers.
 And me on LC:
The LC cites a WHO study arguing that heavy drinkers are no less elastic than other drinkers. A quick check shows the WHO is looking at 2-3 studies while the above-linked one [me citing Wagenaar] is a meta-study of more than a hundred, with results that are near identical to another meta-study of similar magnitude. The latter, forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Surveys, doesn't give a breakdown between heavy and light drinkers, but has near identical estimates of average elasticity. I give a heck of a lot more weight to a serious meta-study, and especially when two of them give near-identical results, then to a couple of pieces picked from the potential list. If there are more than a hundred studies, you can always find a few that give you numbers you like.

Looking more closely at the Law Commission's preferred WHO finding, ... wow. Terrible work.
While heavy drinkers are sometimes thought to be likely to be less affected by price, the Committee found that the evidence does not support this belief, with higher prices affecting the amounts consumed by frequent and heavy drinkers. This finding is supported by a large body of evidence which has shown an impact of prices on harms caused by alcohol, also indicating therefore that heavier drinking has been reduced (34). Natural experiments that have occurred recently in Europe as part of changes required as consequences of economic treaties have shown that as alcohol taxes and prices have been lowered, so sales and alcohol consumption have increased (37). In some jurisdictions in Europe, special taxes have been introduced for spirit-based sweet premixed drinks, in response to increases in young people’s drinking (38). These have led to reductions in sales and consumption of the specific drinks.
Nothing in the paragraph supports the WHO's argument. Nothing. Demand curves slope downwards, that's all they're saying. All groups are somewhat elastic in that demand drops when price increases. The question at hand is whether moderate drinkers reduce their consumption by more than do heavy drinkers, and they provide zero evidence supporting their opening claim. I cannot see how the Law Commission dismissed the findings of the meta-study based on this paragraph.
Why does this matter? There are a whole pile of price-based regulations that get recommended because of potential effects on binge drinking: alcohol minimum pricing, alcohol excise, banning price discounting at bars (happy hours), for example. Nelson finds they don't really do much, whether for youths, young adults, or adults. Some fun results from field experiments:
The natural experiments examine tax reductions on beer and wine (Hong Kong), spirits (Sweden, 14 Switzerland), and all beverages (Finland). Tax cuts range from 100% in Hong Kong to about 30-50% in Nordic countries. A study for Finland by Helakorpi and colleagues (2010) finds mixed effects on binge drinking, while four other studies report null effects on binge drinking and heavy drinking more generally. In some cases, empirical results appear to be dominated by existing trends toward less binge drinking, which are not offset by tax cuts and reductions in alcohol prices.
There are four field studies for the United States, one for Australia, and one for the United Kingdom. Varied price measures are examined: free alcohol at events (2 studies); price discounting such as pitcher specials, drinking game discounts, and buying rounds (3); fixed fee/ cover charges for all-you-can drink (one study); and average price comparisons by drinking level (one study). A study by Clapp and colleagues (2003) reports null results for free alcohol, but Wagoner and colleagues (2012) find that free drinks increase binge drinking by both genders.
Thombs and colleagues (2009) report that fixed-fees increase chances of intoxication among college students, but other price promotions are not significant. Stockwell and colleagues (1993) reports null results for price discounting among young adults in Australia, while Jamison and Myers (2008) and O’Mara et al. (2009) report mixed results for binge drinking and intoxication. Overall, this is a mixed set of results. Four United States studies use college student respondents, so results can be compared to seven studies using Harvard CAS data. Three CAS studies report that fixed fees increase binge participation (Powell et al., 2002; Wechsler et al., 2000; Weitzman et al., 2003), but three studies also report null results for fixed fees or free drinks (Williams et al.,2005; Wolaver, 2007; Wolaver et al., 2007a).
A few further points:
  • The cutoff for binge drinking in the NZ data is 5 standard drinks for youths and 7 for adults. Seven standard drinks is more than I would have in a typical session. But a half litre of Renaissance Scotch Ale, at 7%, is 2.8 standard drinks. Say you get to the Staff Club at 4:30 on a cool winter's day and have a pint. Then you have another at 6. Then you have a half-pint at 7:30. You've just had a binge drinking session, and you've very likely not gotten drunk. Sure, it's more than you should have on average every night, but you don't go to the Staff Club every night, do you? Binge drinking encompasses a range of drinking patterns both harmful and (relatively) harmless.
  • There's been a fair bit of recent media talk around the burden of drunks in the emergency department. I'd love to know how much of that could be reduced by having a separate facility, staffed by a paramedic and a cop, where drunks with minor injuries, or who are too intoxicated to drop anywhere else, could be kept until they're sober enough to release. Put a fee for service on the facility so it recoups its costs. It's no surprise that emergency room doctors get fed up with obnoxious drunks who get dumped there. Question is why we're leaving so many there for so long rather than moving them on to far less costly holding facilities. 

Unstable equilibria: Conan Doyle edition

Gordon Tullock saw the equilibrium in Competing for Aid: the most pitiable beggar will be the one drawing the rent, and so all will compete to be the most pitiful.

Conan Doyle didn't. From The Man with the Twisted Lip's dramatic climax (spoiler alert for those who haven't read it):
“You are the first who have ever heard my story. My father was a schoolmaster in Chesterfield, where I received an excellent education. I travelled in my youth, took to the stage, and finally became a reporter on an evening paper in London. One day my editor wished to have a series of articles upon begging in the metropolis, and I volunteered to supply them. There was the point from which all my adventures started. It was only by trying begging as an amateur that I could get the facts upon which to base my articles. When an actor I had, of course, learned all the secrets of making up, and had been famous in the green-room for my skill. I took advantage now of my attainments. I painted my face, and to make myself as pitiable as possible I made a good scar and fixed one side of my lip in a twist by the aid of a small slip of flesh-coloured plaster. Then with a red head of hair, and an appropriate dress, I took my station in the business part of the city, ostensibly as a match-seller but really as a beggar. For seven hours I plied my trade, and when I returned home in the evening I found to my surprise that I had received no less than 26s. 4d.
“I wrote my articles and thought little more of the matter until, some time later, I backed a bill for a friend and had a writ served upon me for £25. I was at my wit’s end where to get the money, but a sudden idea came to me. I begged a fortnight’s grace from the creditor, asked for a holiday from my employers, and spent the time in begging in the City under my disguise. In ten days I had the money and had paid the debt.
“Well, you can imagine how hard it was to settle down to arduous work at £2 a week when I knew that I could earn as much in a day by smearing my face with a little paint, laying my cap on the ground, and sitting still. It was a long fight between my pride and the money, but the dollars won at last, and I threw up reporting and sat day after day in the corner which I had first chosen, inspiring pity by my ghastly face and filling my pockets with coppers. Only one man knew my secret. He was the keeper of a low den in which I used to lodge in Swandam Lane, where I could every morning emerge as a squalid beggar and in the evenings transform myself into a well-dressed man about town. This fellow, a Lascar, was well paid by me for his rooms, so that I knew that my secret was safe in his possession.
“Well, very soon I found that I was saving considerable sums of money. I do not mean that any beggar in the streets of London could earn £700 a year—which is less than my average takings—but I had exceptional advantages in my power of making up, and also in a facility of repartee, which improved by practice and made me quite a recognised character in the City. All day a stream of pennies, varied by silver, poured in upon me, and it was a very bad day in which I failed to take £2.
“As I grew richer I grew more ambitious, took a house in the country, and eventually married, without anyone having a suspicion as to my real occupation. My dear wife knew that I had business in the City. She little knew what.
If one could have earned a great living in London by being an excellent object of pity, other beggars would have used self-mutilation as substitute for our Mr. St. Clair's make-up skills; it must then have been St. Clair's particular rhetorical skills that drew the rent. Perhaps St. Clair is better considered a busking performance artist in a winner-take-all market. But it still seems a pretty unstable equilibrium.

Tuesday, 28 January 2014

Moar kids

Overshadowed (predictably) by Lorde's Grammy wins was Labour's policy announcement. Should Labour form government, they'd like to pay parents $60 per week for the first year of the child's life. 95% of children are meant to be covered by the plan, which is not income contingent for the first $150,000 of family income but abates to zero immediately at $150,000. Parents of 2 and 3 year olds would also receive up to $60 per week. Those with family income less than $50k/year would receive the full $60/week for the extra two years, abating to zero by $80k annual income for those with one child and somewhat more slowly for those with two or three children.

The policy will likely increase fertility rates. We can look to two decent studies for evidence. First, Josh Gans and Andrew Leigh found that an Australian baby bonus programme induced a very strong timing effect: women delayed giving birth until 1 July, when the programme came into effect. This suggests that people do respond to these kinds of incentives, but it doesn't tell us whether the programme increased total fertility or just affected the timing.

Of more relevance for present purposes, Kevin Milligan found that Quebec's baby bonus increased fertility in Quebec relative to that in other provinces for the duration of the programme. For those without NBER access, here's the CD Howe summary. Canada's federal system provided him a nice way of running difference-in-difference to be able to infer causality. While the programme mostly paid families for children they would have had anyway, he did nevertheless find a substantial effect on fertility. He writes:
...the estimates suggest a strong, positive, and robust impact of the policy on fertility. In the model containing the full set of control variables, the fertility of those eligible for the new program is estimated to have increased by 12 per cent on average, and by 25 per cent for those eligible for the maximum benefit
As the Quebec programme's intention seemed to have been to produce more Quebecois,* Milligan figured out the cost per child-who-would-not-otherwise-have existed. It cost about $15,000 per additional child. Is that value-for-money? Depends what you think a child is worth. I think life is worth at least that much to each of the children who wouldn't otherwise be born, and that New Zealand is so far below optimal population size that it would be a bargain, if results here were similar.

Milligan also found some really interesting demographic effects.

Suppose your model of the world is as follows. Poorer people have lower IQ on average and are more likely to be income-constrained against having another child. We might then expect that a lump sum baby bonus, like Labour's, and like Quebec's, that doesn't scale with income, would differentially encourage poorer people to have more children. Then, this.

Milligan found instead that the greatest policy effect on fertility was in the middle income ranges - those earning $50,000 or so in Canadian dollars at the time. The poorest groups didn't see much fertility increase. Milligan speculates that the group either didn't know about the policy or were farther away from being at the margin where another child would be desired. There also was less fertility response among rich cohorts, for whom income would not have been the binding constraint anyway.

Some of the demographic separation could be due to the structure of the Quebec programme. After the programme was made a bit more generous in 1992, it paid $500 on the birth of a first child. The birth of a woman's second child also generated a $500 payment as well as another $500 on that child's first birthday. Things got far more generous for larger families: third and subsequent children drew twenty quarterly payments of $400 ($31/week) for a total of $8000. Milligan then, as expected, finds the largest effect on the likelihood of a woman's bearing a third or further child. Where the very poorest women cannot afford a first child, a $500 payment is unlikely to change things much. Only those who were more affluent to start with could afford to reach the hurdle necessary for accessing the payments for very large families.

We then shouldn't conclude that the differential fertility effect will necessarily hold under Labour's proposed scheme, which provides fairly generous payments for any newborn regardless of parity. As Labour's proposed payments for children after their first birthday abates quickly for families earning more than $50,000, we might expect a humped effect where there would be little effect on fertility decisions among the very poorest cohorts, rising effects up to $50,000, then attenuating effects thereafter. I wouldn't be surprised to see negative fertility effects in the upper-middle income cohorts due to income effects, but that would depend on how Labour finances the scheme.

The tldr; summary then:

  • Labour's programme is near certain to increase total fertility rates, regardless of how much snark leftie folks on Twitter want to throw around about "Oh, would you want to take care of my kid for $60 a week then?" They're nuts to suggest it won't happen. You don't need the programme to cover all the costs of child-rearing - you just need that some people had just barely decided against having a(nother) kid due to the cost and that these people change their mind under the new programme. I hate seeing tweets from people who know better pretending the opposite. You're not idiots - why pretend to be idiots on Twitter? Go read Kevin Milligan. 
  • We should perhaps worry less about "Oh, well, poor people are just going to have a pile of kids in order to draw the payments then, and anybody who'd decide to have a kid on that basis is exactly the kind of person who shouldn't be a parent." Milligan's results suggest that they don't, but we need to be very careful on that one as we just don't know what would have happened if the Quebec payments had been really generous for first and second children. It's possible that Matthew Hooton's right here and that there will be a strong fertility response among the poorest cohorts. 

Other observations:

  • Bill Kaye-Blake is right that the $150k family income cutoff is a bit odd. 
  • I would love to see somebody put together a new Effective Marginal Tax Rate schedule incorporating Labour's proposed changes. The abatement rates from $50k-$80k household income are pretty sharp. We'd also see a very large EMTR spike at $150k: the $1 that pushes you from $149,999 to $150,000 in family income will cost you $3120 if you have a newborn. 
  • Because of the large EMTR effect based on household income for those with newborns, I expect this will induce many second-earners, predominantly women, to spend longer outside of the labour force on the birth of a child. We'd see this in higher-earning couples, where the second-earner's income pushes family income above $150,000, and in middle-earning couples in the high abatement ranges. 
  • The plan's proposed extension of paid parental leave to 26 weeks will intensify the effect above. Consequently, small businesses may be more reticent to hire women of prime childbearing ages. The costs of bearing a half-year's likely leave are not trivial for employers. The wage gap will consequently increase. Sadly, National's jumping onto this bandwagon as well. 


* Milligan infers this from the increasing payment schedule. As there are economies of scale in child-rearing, a model designed simply to compensate for child-related costs would have a large payment for the first child, with lower payments thereafter. Political discourse at the time, if I recall correctly, was entirely pro-natalist. Citizens and Permanent Residents had access to the payments, immigrants who hadn't made PR weren't. Quebec nationalists later blamed "money, and the ethnic vote" for the failed sovereignty referendum; breeding more pure-laine was a potential solution.

Pernicious housing equilibria

Homeowners are the worst.

Living in cities lets us reap the benefits of agglomeration: being near others in similar or complementary industries makes each of us more productive. Wages are higher in cities not because of the cost of living but rather because people are more productive there - otherwise, firms would just move out to the sticks. Higher productivity in cities is what allows the cost of living there to be higher.

In the latest AEJ: Microeconomics (ungated), Ortalo-Magne and Prat build a nice little model explaining how urban homeowners manage to appropriate the agglomeration gains. They invest in housing, then vote against any policy that would allow the supply of housing to increase, whether from suburban growth or increased density. When cities can't grow up or out, prices go up.* The better the city, the stronger the incentive for homeowners to start siphoning out the agglomeration gains via restrictive housing policy. Here's their political economy mechanism:
...we assume that (i) adding a house to a city requires a building permit, and that (ii) local residents have a say (vote) on the number of permits to be issued every period. The issue of building permits affects voters through three channels. First, new housing construction reduces their housing rents for the remainder of their lives. Second, lower future rents imply an immediate drop in the price of their housing investment. Third, voters may capture some benefits from any windfall gains deriving from the new construction permits if permits are sold to developers and the revenues are used for local services (for example).
 ...We find there are stationary equilibria, where a city is below its optimal size, yet the median cohort and all older agents oppose urban growth because they have made sizeable housing investments. Agents also continue to invest heavily in housing, because they expect the majority to oppose urban growth in the future. Before they made purchase decisions, all agents would have preferred a larger city, so that housing would have been cheaper and more people could have located there but the equilibrium is sustained because the median voter is someone who already owns housing.
They find that subsidising housing encourages greater investment in housing and greater homeowner opposition to urban growth, making housing even more expensive. Other implications:
  • Moving land use authority away from local governments and up to central government shifts the identity of the median voter and reduces the rentiers' power;
  • Splitting up cities into multiple smaller competing jurisdictions can facilitate greater housing supply: basically, the permit fees paid by a developer are split across the smaller number of people in the smaller jurisdiction, but the capital losses from lower house prices are spread over the broader jurisdiction. 
So: don't amalgamate cities. If you do, you'll need to have a central government putting a strong boot to the throat of local councils to force them to ease up on land supply. We're starting to see some of the latter in New Zealand.

* I'm sure I stole this line from Ed Glaeser.