Tuesday, 21 January 2014

Al the Human

Whenever I watch Finn's quest to implement Pareto-improving moves despite the incompatibility of others' wants and the downright misanthropy of some actors, I, like you, can't help but think of Al Roth.

Economists know that we could save lives if we allowed markets in human organs. Because many people who do not need organs, and some who do, find such markets repugnant, they would oppose political candidates who would change the laws to allow these markets to exist. Transplant surgeons and medical ethicists loudly oppose such moves. Because politicians wish to be elected, they also oppose policies that would save lives but that many voters oppose. And so we cannot have nice things.

Most of us spend our time yelling about how people should be different and that they should stop banning other people from doing things that don't affect them. Al Roth instead finds moves that work despite the stupid-people problem, and rightly won the Nobel for it.

Becker & Elias have updated their prior work on the number of lives that could be saved if we had market incentives encouraging organ supply. Al Roth comments on it here.
So, the arguments that they repeat have gotten stronger over time: the shortage of organs is costly in every sense, and could likely be relieved by allowing kidneys to be bought and sold by live donors, and allowing the purchase of organs from deceased potential donors, i.e. by repealing the part of the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act that makes such sales a felony in the United States. (Similar laws exist in most of the developed world: the only country that seems to have an explicitly legal market for kidneys is Iran, although many black and grey markets exist.)

So, why hasn't this argument made any headway, either in the U.S. or overseas? Is patient repetition of the argument the best way to make the case? I don't know the answers, but I think that the repugnance of organ sales is a subject worth studying, not just for science but also for those who might like to influence policy.
He further points to work with Stephen Leider looking at public opinion around organ markets. They find that a majority of the public support some forms of organ markets, and that this is consistent with prior survey evidence. They also note prior evidence that transplant specialists and physicians are far more opposed to donor compensation than are other members of the public. There's greatest support for compensation where compensation is paid by the insurance system or the government rather than by the person needing the kidney.
We find majority approval of each kidney market, though a majority supports legality only for markets with the government or insurance companies as purchaser. This suggests that monetary compensation to donors by institutional intermediaries could receive public support. Both general disapproval of body-related markets and disapproval of market encroachment on traditionally non-market spheres contribute to disapproval of kidney markets; however we find no evidence that generally negative attitudes towards markets drive this repugnance. Social conservatism and being a religiously active Christian also predict of kidney market disapproval, though largely as proxies for general disapproval for body-related markets. Furthermore, disapproval for kidney markets seems driven by concerns about repugnant transactions at least as much as sensitivity to specific policy details. Unless proposals engage these fundamental concerns, perhaps by addressing the long-term welfare of kidney providers, they will fail to address the objections of a substantial minority. 
If New Zealand voters are similar to those in the States, then the policy recommendation would be payments from the government to live donors, payments from the government to cadaveric donors, and a guarantee that live kidney or liver donors get priority queueing should they ever need a kidney or liver. It also suggests that public opposition could be far less fierce than we might have thought if we only listened to the transplantation ethicists.

Roth continues:
Judd Kessler and I have a paper forthcoming in the American Economic Review papers and proceedings (May 2014) called "Getting More Organs for Transplantation," in which we summarize the issue this way:

"Kidney sales are often the leading example of a repugnant transaction cited by those who would put stricter limits on markets in general (e.g. Sandel 2012, 2013), because of their sense that such sales arouse widespread opposition. A representative sample survey of Americans conducted by Leider and Roth (2010) suggests that disapproval of kidney sales correlates with other socially conservative attitudes, but that it does not rise to the level of disapproval of other repugnant transactions such as prostitution. In addition, there is evidence that the manner of the payment to an organ donor may mitigate some of the repugnance concerns. Niederle and Roth (forthcoming 2014) find that payments to non-directed kidney donors are deemed more acceptable when they arise as a reward for heroism and public service than when they are viewed as a payment for kidneys."


That paper closes with this thought on the presently available options: 
"While these potential donors could save thousands of additional lives, at current rates of medical need, these donors alone would not be able to supply all the demand. Consequently, we must continue working on numerous fronts to solve this growing problem. "

In summary, the issue of whether and how organ donors might be compensated is an important policy issue that also touches on an important and still poorly understood social science phenomenon. Repetition of the basic arguments may move the discussion forward as the background facts become more severe, and it's great to see the issue addressed in such a public forum as the WSJ. But it may also be that repetition of arguments is not enough. To make progress in the face of opposition, it seems likely to be useful to understand better the nature of the opposition.
 I wonder whether there's any New Zealand survey data.

Monday, 20 January 2014

DotBets

There not yet being iPredict markets on Kim DotCom's yet-to-be-registered political party, I've been reduced to bilateral bets.

I figure there's an 80% chance, or thereabouts, that there will be some new political party with which Kim DotCom is affiliated. 

I also put even odds on that there will be substantial Snowdon GCSB revelations during the election campaign. Our election is coming up this year. The Snowdon releases thus far haven't said much about New Zealand, but he and Greenwald seem to be timing things for best media effect. So why wouldn't they have saved any of the good NZ stuff for the election? 

Conditional on this party's being established, and conditional on there being substantial GCSB stuff coming out during the election, I expect that Kim DotCom will be exceptionally well placed to capitalise on it. And so, in that state of the world, I put even odds on that DotCom gets 5% of the party vote.

So 0.8 * 0.5 * 0.5 = 20% chance that DotCom gets 5%. One chance in five.

@BKDrinkwater and @kiwipollguy reckoned that overstated DotCom's chances. So they each put $80 up against my $20. If some DotCom party gets in at 5%, they each owe me $80. If some DotCom party doesn't get in at 5%, I owe each of them $20. @ClintVSmith did a bit of yapyapyap about how my numbers were wrong, but wouldn't put any money on it. 

That both Drinkwater and Heffernan took the other side of the bet suggests that I've likely overestimated things somewhere. I'm not sure which parts of the combinatorial they figured I'd overestimated. I suppose iPredict will let me know sooner or later. 

I've reckoned that there's space in the NZ political market for a party that's strong on civil liberties but is also friendly to free markets. The Greens own the "civil liberties, except around smoking tobacco and eating, plus heavy state control of the economy" space. ACT has the free market spot but isn't credible on civil liberties when it comes to surveillance issues: ACT's enthusiastic support of the GCSB power extension means they've no chance on that issue, regardless of any leadership change. No new party, or at least no successor to ACT, can come up in the traditional liberal "free minds, free markets" space while ACT is still there. 

But a civil liberties party that stays basically neutral on economic issues other than favouring whatever makes internet better could do really well. 

Chris Keall over at Ars Technica provides a nice summary of last week's cancelled DotCom party. Kim DotCom planned an album release party and everyone was invited. The Electoral Commission thought it might count as "Treating" - providing of gifts in hopes that those so-gifted would reciprocate with votes. This application of the law doesn't make any darned sense to me. Suppose that, at your party's annual convention, a band played. Would that be treating? How about if you have a hospitality suite with free drinks? What if the party's meeting is held in an exclusive spot that's otherwise hard to get into, and the fee for attending is way less than the venue would normally charge out at? And if the distinction here is whether the event is members-only, surely DotCom could have signed up each and every attendee as a $1 member of his new party and called it members-only too. 

At its core there is an adolescent mindset here: uncritical fandom with all the depth and maturity as a bunch of screaming teenagers at a Justin Bieber concert on the positive side, and on the negative side, a pubescent screech of "you're not the boss of me!" directed at both the current New Zealand government and the US authorities.
I'm not sure that changes much of the reckoning above. Sure, he doesn't have a slate of policies. But, at least for now, that ambiguity is a major advantage for him. Without policies, every fan of DotCom, adolescent or not, can project their idealised policies onto him. Any policy he announces will disappoint some faction. Staying quiet on everything other than surveillance and internet policy gives him flexibility for any post-election negotiations. 

And a "You're not the boss of me" party could crack 5% if we get Greenwald/Snowdon revelations that, hypothetically, the NSA's Waihopi spy base is being used to scrape down and store each and every text message sent within New Zealand, monitor all our phone calls, and that NSA has taps on the cables running into New Zealand. 

Thursday, 16 January 2014

Netflix Premium

Last year brought Netflix euphoria. I figured out how to access it from New Zealand and fell in love. Where I had been ripping my DVD collection to hard disk to save on storage costs, punting boxes of DVDs to the garage, I started just checking whether each was available on Netflix. It's easier to stream than to rip.

And so the New Year brought a reduction in Netflix's stock of film rights. Where rights-holders had been happy to sell them streaming rights at low costs when Netflix wasn't much of a competitive threat to their cable offerings, that changed when folks started seeing them instead as substitutes. Bloomberg explains that they just can't maintain their library on $8/month subscription fees.

I'm sure that the Bloomberg piece is right. But what about $40/month subscription fees? I'd be happy to pay that much for streaming access to everything in Netflix's DVD collection. They could call it Netflix Premium.

I don't know that this strategy could work. The rights-holders would rightly expect that most Premium subscribers would be substituting away from some of their (potentially) higher value cable subscribers, and, more importantly, away from their DVD and Blue-Ray offerings. But they'd likely also be picking up some who never would have paid for a DVD but were hitting the Pirate Bay.

Things that consequently need testing:

  • What's the elasticity of downloading with respect to Netflix availability? We've the potential for some clean tests, with films coming into and out of Netflix availability, along with differential geographic access to Netflix. 
  • What's the elasticity of DVD/BlueRay sales with respect to Netflix availability? Same testing potential as above.
  • If Netflix does more to turn pirates into paying customers than it does to induce cable/DVD customers to flip to Netflix, then making it too expensive for Netflix to get rights is a bad idea.

Wednesday, 15 January 2014

Nay-saying

The Christchurch Press suggests moving parts of the Christchurch Re-Start mall to New Brighton.
Zaanen, who is also involved with the New Brighton Project, said the pop-up mall could be housed on Marine Parade, opposite the library.
''It's the perfect place and I totally think it could work," he said.
''Everyone, including the council, wants to see New Brighton moving forward and while there's always going to be nay-sayers who don't think it could work, that's not the sort of attitude we want.''
He said some of the current Re:Start retailers were ''naturally aimed at this market'', while others would not work in the area.
''We can tweak it and make it fit this area and obviously the landscaping would be different because we're at the beach, not in the CBD.''
Saying nay can be risky, so this is more of a skeptical note rather than nay-saying.

The New Brighton Mall has been in really poor shape for rather a while. I've lived in South New Brighton since 2005 and watched the Mall's decline since then, even before the quakes. Higher end retailing simply cannot survive there unless there's either a reasonable gentrification push or the retail development is sufficient to pull in tourists or people from the rest of town. The modal retailer on the Mall, currently, is a dollar store.

The Re-Start Mall has been great. I've really enjoyed going there and wouldn't mind at all if it continued in that space. But it works, at least in part, because of where it is. There wasn't a lot else going on downtown for a while, but that's where tourists and others still wanted to go. Put something cool in a spot where people want to be and it'll do well. Move some fraction of it out to the Brighton Pier and, well, I really hope it does well.

I'm not saying it can't be done; Cassels have done a great job of turning a Woolston warehouse into an upscale retail development anchored by a fantastic brewpub. It's a destination. But they started with the Brewpub, saw that they could draw people in, then started expanding out. Brighton has a few great features - the Pier and library are lovely. Switch and Fuze are great cafes; South of India has some of Christchurch's best Indian food. And there's the beach. But the Brighton Mall's just a bit sad.

Here's how it could work though. Developers who've been sitting on really run-down rental houses around the Brighton Mall might see the Re-Start move as the trigger for bowling the darned things and finally putting up some higher density, higher end housing. The zoning changes allowing this to happen came in 2009 and, unfortunately, coincided with the worst of the recession and then the earthquake. The land along Marine Parade is TC2-Yellow, or about as good as most of Christchurch. The Brighton area then starts attracting more residents who can support some of the higher-end retail and cafes beyond the initial tourist interest.

We'd then want an express bus route from the downtown bus station to the Brighton Mall so that tourists had some hope of getting there. We'd also want the EQC offices to put a higher priority on sorting out anything involving the L4 and L3 land around the Brighton Mall. I wish I knew what were now holding things up. The city has a massive housing shortage and few places allowing for high-density development. New Brighton has land with the right zoning. Is it that developers reckon the Brighton beach can't be gentrified, or are there substantial insurance issues yet to be resolved?

Conflicts disclosure: I live down in South Brighton, and so I suppose I do better where the New Brighton Mall isn't a dive. I frequent some of the shops on the New Brighton mall, but am pretty unlikely to start taking any bus from the Brighton Mall to downtown.

The pure distillation

The funniest part of this anti-sugar piece from Lustig and his UCSF team? Here:
Sugar, they argue, is far from just “empty calories” that make people fat. At the levels consumed by most Americans, sugar changes metabolism, raises blood pressure, critically alters the signaling of hormones and causes significant damage to the liver – the least understood of sugar’s damages. These health hazards largely mirror the effects of drinking too much alcohol, which they point out in their commentary is the distillation of sugar.
If you set up a still with a sugar cube on one side, you might get a bit of water vapour out the other end after trying to distil, and, if you're lucky, caramel in the original flask. Mmmm, caramel. But to get alcohol, you're going to have to ferment that sugar with some yeast. Distillation gets you spirits from fermented alcohol.

The less funny part? The way the whole nudge apparatus has been imported over.
Many of the interventions that have reduced alcohol and tobacco consumption can be models for addressing the sugar problem, such as levying special sales taxes, controlling access, and tightening licensing requirements on vending machines and snack bars that sell high sugar products in schools and workplaces.
“We’re not talking prohibition,” Schmidt said. “We’re not advocating a major imposition of the government into people’s lives. We’re talking about gentle ways to make sugar consumption slightly less convenient, thereby moving people away from the concentrated dose. What we want is to actually increase people’s choices by making foods that aren’t loaded with sugar comparatively easier and cheaper to get.”
No, it's not prohibition. Not yet. This was an entirely foreseeable and foreseen consequence of Thaler's nudge architecture, but taxes and licensing requirements on vending machines are hardly "make the tempting thing slightly less convenient" nudges.

Andrew Stuttaford at NRO also doesn't like the idea that this somehow increases people's range of choices.
What they “actually” mean by that is that sugar-heavy products will be made more expensive and more difficult to obtain thereby making it easier for the child-like American population to “choose” the healthier alternative.
A shove's as good as a nudge to a blind bat....

Another for the "there's no slippery slope" file.

Tuesday, 14 January 2014

Flood risk

Christchurch Council's starting to worry about sea level rises and global warming. As much of the land on the east side of town sank with the earthquake, these risks are a bit bigger than they'd previously been.

There's been a bit of speculation about how this will affect zoning in future, with some recommendations of higher minimum floor heights above sea level. Here's the Tonkin and Taylor report; Cresswell has a skeptical take.

Wouldn't it make more sense simply to have EQC set risk adjusted insurance premiums? Zoning changes mandating higher floor levels only really apply on new builds or, potentially, on substantial-enough building redevelopments. While new buildings will then get the higher floor levels, some older ones will have replacement or refurbishment delayed because the relative cost of a new building's gone up. If EQC set actuarially fair rates for their disaster insurance, the distortion would be gone. We'd also then avoid all of the fights and rent-seeking that will result when Council starts deciding where people will be allowed to build in future due to flood risk, arguments about how seriously we should take the upper-limit projections on sea level changes, and the like. Let the insurers set the premiums, then let individuals sort out whether they like current beachside property. And let EQC's premiums basically reflect the incremental effects of insuring different types of properties on EQC's reinsurance costs. If Swiss Re won't provide reinsurance for my house except at additional charge, I should be paying the costs of that. Where EQC's trying to minimise its reinsurance costs and where the international reinsurance markets are at least somewhat competitive, this knocks the political fights around global warming out of the mix.

Tim Harford comments usefully on distortions caused when government subsidises living on flood plains. EQC premiums are scaled by value at risk, but not by the likelihood of adverse events. The country varies in seismic and flood risk; buildings vary in robustness to those risks. But nobody pays more than $150 per year for their EQC cover. While you might think the distortion can't be that big as EQC only covers the first $100,000 in damage to your house, with insurers charging actuarially fair premiums taking on the bigger part, EQC also covers land remediation.

Conflicts disclosure: Our house in South Brighton, two blocks from the beach, is a couple of meters above road level. The road's a meter or two above sea level. I expect that, as we're at least a meter higher than neighbours down the road, the regulatory changes likely aren't binding on us. But I sure wouldn't be happy about any zoning designations saying that the spit south of Bridge Street needed to go back to bush and sand because of worries about sea level rises a century out.

Monday, 13 January 2014

Guaranteed Minimum Income

TANSTAAFL applies, as always.

Matt Zwolinski makes the libertarian case for a guaranteed annual income over at the BHL blog. It's not a bad case. Here's Matt:
The first of these posts elaborated on the (quasi-Nozickian) argument that a BIG could serve as a kind of rough-and-ready compensation for past injustice. David Friedman and David Henderson both took issue with this argument as I articulated it in my original essay. But I’m not convinced. The federal government was directly responsible and/or culpably complicit in the commission of a long series of gross injustices, and many currently existing Americans continue to suffer the effects of those injustices. The government owes those who were harmed by its wrongdoing some form of redress, and I think there are plausible grounds for using a BIG to make that redress. I haven’t seen any published responses to this essay yet, but I’d be interested in talking more about the issues of historical redress, collective responsibility, and second-best theory that it raises.
My second post tried to explain why Friedrich Hayek supported a basic income. Or, perhaps more accurately, it tried to develop an argument based on Hayekian considerations. It’s not an argument that Hayek actually made. But it’s an argument that’s rooted in the quasi-republican account of freedom and coercion that he developed in The Constitution of Liberty, and I think it’s an argument he probably would have endorsed. Essentially, the argument is that a basic income is necessary to keep people out of the kind of poverty that could render them vulnerable to coercion by employers and others with economic power. I’m sure a lot of libertarians will bristle at the notions of “coercion” and “freedom” employed in the argument, but I think that there’s a lot to be said on their behalf, and that they’re worth taking seriously.
He also has a great links roundup of others' commentary; David Friedman's critique is particularly good.

The basic problem with guaranteed income schemes is that they cannot really replace the welfare state. It would be great if they could, because we could then do away with a whole pile of messiness around really high effective marginal tax rates when abatement starts kicking in on a bunch of means-tested policies, and a whole pile of transactions costs around assessing eligibility for different benefits.

Think of it this way. Imagine the level of support currently granted to somebody who's really badly off: a bunch of disability-related benefits, income support, child-related support, housing support and the like. The total value of that bundle is going to be large. If you set up a GAI to make sure this person is no worse off, the average and marginal tax rates needed to support paying everybody that amount would be crippling. If you instead set up a GAI to pay everybody a basic income and have other support schemes on top of that for those with particular needs, you keep much of the current welfare apparatus but add in the substantial hit to marginal tax rates of giving everybody the GAI payment.

I don't think the basic math's changed much since I wrote about it in 2011; Treasury had then reckoned we'd need a flat personal tax rate of between 50% and 56% to make it work. Again, we're faced with Milligan's Impossibility: In any GAI, you can only pick two of the following three:

  1. low tax rate
  2. high benefit
  3. balanced budget

The University of Manitoba's Evelyn Forget has done some nice work on a guaranteed minimum income scheme trialed in Dauphin a few decades ago. Straight cash transfers to people in Dauphin from people mostly outside of Dauphin did a lot of good for a lot of people in Dauphin. I wonder what it would have looked like if Dauphin's higher income earners and businesses had to cover the programme's costs.