Standards shopping

Small jurisdictions have a hard time covering all the bases. Developing regulations is expensive. If you're determined to have "My Jurisdiction" versions of each and every regulation that could be out there, you're either going to have a ridiculously expensive regulatory regime or you're going to stymie development in niche markets.

Yesterday I pointed to the problems facing Manitoba's Harborside Farms. They want to develop traditional Italian cured meats in small artisanal batches for sale in Manitoba. But they're forbidden from doing it because, unless you can prove your product meets Manitoba regulations, you can't sell it. And it's a sufficiently small market that Manitoba never got around to writing any regulations that would allow them to operate.

Leaving aside for now the very sensible alternative of simply allowing standard consumer protection legislation and liability solve this kind of issue, there's an obvious alternative. Let them produce their product under the Italian regulations, then have Manitoba inspectors verify that they've met the Italian standard.

The problem is very similar to one facing importers of niche-market DVDs in New Zealand. How? You can't sell DVDs here unless you get them rated by the Censor's Office. And they don't rate DVDs for free. If you make a buck a piece on the sale, you'd still need to ship a thousand units in a country of four million people (and change) to cover just the ratings cost.

The solution there is the same as that which should obtain for Harborside. Allow import of films that have been rated by the Australians, or the Canadians, or the Brits, or the Americans, or some other set of trusted countries, and simply require that the ratings sticker note the country which issued the rating.

This kind of solution can be applied across rather a few thin-market small-jurisdiction scenarios. Why does every small area have to reinvent every wheel?

Take it a step further. If Manitobans can import Italian-made products meeting Italian standards, why shouldn't they be able to produce things in Manitoba to Italian specifications, even if a Manitoba regulation does exist? Simply require that the product be labelled as meeting Italy's standards.

Maybe it wouldn't work for everything. A building that meets Canadian building standards instead of New Zealand standards would be better than a New Zealand standard building, unless there's an earthquake. But again, it isn't hard to imagine strange niche construction areas where there might not be domestic specifications, but where the Japanese standards would work a treat.

The fixed costs of developing regulations aren't trivial. Why not allow a bit of forum shopping to spread the burden?

Food Fight

Oh, Manitoba. Just when you start looking sane, you go back to your old wacky ways.

Recall that Manitoba is the province where you can't sell a potato without, well, hassles.*

Now, read this one and weep. Since I was a kid in Manitoba, the government made much fuss about agricultural diversification, wanting farmers to move to more processing and oddball thin-market crops.

The Cavers at Harborside Farms are a great example of how this can be done well. They raise Berkshire hogs outside of Pilot Mound, a small town a couple hours southwest of Winnipeg. They started curing hams following old Italian recipes. Bartley Kives reports:

In May, Manitoba Agriculture Food and Rural Initiatives awarded a $10,000 prize to Harborside Farms, after inviting owner Pamela and Clinton Cavers to compete in a contest called the Great Manitoba Food Fight in Brandon.

The cash prize for the Cavers' pastured-pork prosciutto was intended to help the couple further commercialize the cured meats they had been producing on their farm since 2008, using traditional Italian recipes.

In June, inspectors from a different branch of MAFRI ordered Harborside to stop selling all of its cured meats, known in culinary terms as charcuterie, which had appeared on the tables of higher-end Winnipeg restaurants such as Pizzeria Gusto and Bistro 71/4.

The Cavers, who also hoped to sell their product at De Luca's Specialty Foods, claim they complied with the order.

But on Wednesday, as University of Manitoba environment students were about to tour the Harborside grounds, a pair of inspectors drove up and seized the couple's entire inventory of charcuterie -- about 160 kilograms of the cured pork and beef products known as prosciutto, lonzino, capicollo, bresaola, salumi and soppressata.

The Cavers said they were each handed $600 fines.

"The fine was for selling food unfit for human consumption. This was the same food the agriculture minister ate in May," said Pamela Cavers, referring to MAFRI Minister Ron Kostyshyn, who tasted Harborside's prize-winning prosciutto at the contest in May.

So, was anything wrong with their cured meats? No. Absolutely nothing. But they didn't follow the approved process. Why? Because there wasn't one. They were following traditional processes, the food was safe, and they'd asked the government for advice on making sure they were also compliant with any process specs that the government might wish to impose.

The provincial inspectors took no issue with any aspect of the farm aside from the charcuterie operation, whose entire processes they deemed unsatisfactory, Pamela Cavers said. A June inspection yielded an order to build a separate drying room and acquire instruments to monitor pH levels and moisture, among other issues, she said.

The Cavers said they had been attempting to obtain specific guidelines for producing artisanal charcuterie, but could not receive direction from the provincial food development centre in Portage la Prairie.

"They said they had no idea what to compare it to," she said, adding officials had no experience with charcuterie. She said a call to the minister's office during the Wednesday raid yielded advice to call the chief veterinary officer. "They didn't even know what charcuterie was," she said.

Were the Cavers selling unfit food? No. An informed correspondent tells me that Manitoba Health has no adopted procedures as yet for dry cured meats. The Cavers tried proving that their product was safe, by various bacteria, moisture, and pH tests at the Portage Food Lab. But there's no standard that the government could point to showing whether it was good enough.

Because Manitoba Agriculture, Food and Rural Initiatives (MAFRI) does not have Manitoba Health standards against which they can judge things, they just took all of the Cavers' stuff. Even if the Cavers perfectly followed all of the Italian standards, they're still in violation of Manitoba law. Because they're not following Manitoba standards. Because nobody has written any Manitoba standards.

A rational province would, where no official provincial standard exists, simply adopt an existing proven standard from an outside trusted source and verify that a Manitoba producer's practices meet that standard. Alternatively, perhaps somebody in Manitoba should start trying to get approval to sell chocolate-coated cotton.

There's a petition up here wishing that the Manitoba government be sensible. I hope it's successful.

* See:

• Canadian agriculture is completely screwed up
• Manitoba potato monopoly
• More Manitoba potatoes
• Manitoba potato monopoly...update
• Manitoba potatoes - again!
• Ceasefire in the spud wars

Broken Windows, Part II: Will a Disaster Rebuild Increase Capacity Utilisation?

Following on from yesterday’s post on the broken-windows fallacy, Miguel’s second point is that the broken windows fallacy rests on an assumption of full utilisation of resources (so that resources devoted to repairing damage from a natural disaster have an opportunity cost somewhere else). He notes:

We're clearly not in full employment now, and we weren't before the quakes, so what basis do we have for claiming that "all the resources now devoted to cleaning up and rebuilding would have been employed elsewhere"? My point is that economists are too content to simply make this assertion without actually demonstrating it.

I will concede that it will be extremely difficult to provide evidence, but that is not a cop out. Note that market economies are very good at utilising their resources. We tend to look at unemployment and see the cup as being 5%-10% empty, but it is also 90%-95% full. Employment is less than 1/6^th the size in New Zealand as it is in Australia, but that has nothing to do with the tendency for natural disasters there compared to here. They have more population and so the market economy creates more jobs. We understand pretty well how coordination through price signals achieves this matching of jobs to available workers. What we don’t understand well is why capacity utilisation consistently falls short of 100% and why the utilisation rates fluctuate. We have plenty of plausible stories involving frictions, asymmetric information, expectations, monopoly power, sticky prices, etc. but it is likely that the relative importance of these factors is very dependent on time and place.

So yes, we know that we employment was not at 100% before or since the earthquakes, and that following the GFC, unemployment rates have been higher than before; but we don’t know exactly what determines those rates. We also know that the Reserve Bank monitors economic activity and adjusts policy to try to keep activity at the level consistent with stable inflation; we further know that New Zealand is not close to being in a low-interest-rate liquidity trap, the story often advanced for why monetary policy might not be effective.

With this backdrop, we can’t be sure that the rebuild from a disaster wouldn't result in a greater utilisation rate of resources, but nor can we be sure that it wouldn't result in a lower rate. The best guess, however, would be that rebuilds would be unrelated to whatever it is that results in utilisation rates of less than 100%, and so would have no effect.

Broken Windows, Part I: Measured GDP Versus Welfare

Shamubeel posted here on Monday on whether natural disasters can be beneficial for an economy. In the comments, Miguel Sanchez and I discussed a bit whether economists are too quick to shout “broken windows fallacy” in such cases. There are a couple of interesting issues here, each of which is worth a separate post. 

Miguel points to this paper from the BIS (with a great title up to the colon, pity they felt obliged to add the post-colon clarification). The paper makes the claim that insured events, while not necessarily beneficial are “inconsequential in terms of foregone (sic) output”. A quick skim of the paper suggests that there are two separate aspects to this result. There can be a degree of over-insurance when a natural disaster destroys productive capital, since replacing that capital will typically result in newer and possibly more advanced capital. If the insurance liability falls outside of the region (for instance, as a result of reinsurance), then this improvement to the capital stock will have been financed from outside the region, and it is easy to see that this can generate a situation where a disaster leads to greater output (naturally, to be weighed against any direct human costs of the disaster). A fair amount of the insurance liability in New Zealand, however, fell inside New Zealand. In this case, the resulting improvement in the capital stock can still lead to an increase in the discounted flow of current and future GDP, but only because of a flaw in the way GDP is measured, and not because of any actual benefit.

To explain, consider how intermediate goods are treated in the measurement of GDP. If a household buys foodstuffs to make meals, the expenditure on that food is considered a final good and measured in GDP. If a restaurant buys those same ingredients, however, to prepare meals for customers, the sale of the meals is measured in GDP, but the expenditure on ingredients is not, as their value is already included in the price of the meal. To do otherwise would be double counting. Let’s imagine that, contrary to this normal practice, we were to change the definition of GDP and count both the food sold to restaurants and the meals sold to customers in GDP. In that world, if there was a preference shift and people chose to eat out more, we would see a big increase in measured GDP, but not one that reflected a comparable increase in welfare. Even worse, imagine that the government, under pressure to improve the data on GDP growth were to pass a law requiring people to eat in restaurants rather than at home. Measured GDP would have grown, but welfare would have fallen as people were forced to spend their income in ways different from what they would like.

This is obviously silly, and we would never make such a change to the way GDP is measured. It is, however, exactly analogous to the way we treat investment in GDP. Just as people can choose whether to spend their income on ingredients or eating out, based on relative costs and their own preferences, people can choose whether to consume to today, or save and consume in the future, with the interest they earn from their saving derived in large part from the return that can be obtained from the saving when used to invest. In other words, investment today is just an intermediate good that generates consumption in the future. By including investment in the measure of GDP today and then the flow of output from that investment in the measure of GDP in the future, we are double counting, just we would be if we counted both food sold to restaurants and the meals produced from it. And if a natural disaster leads to an increase in investment, funded not from outside, and not from a decrease in investment elsewhere, but from reduced consumption by those holding the insurance liability, then the flow of measured GDP will rise, but only because of the increased double counting not because of any increase in welfare, just as in the fanciful case where the government required eating out. As best I can see, the result presented by the authors of the BIS paper  rests on this double counting convention. 

I will follow up on Miguel's second point tomorrow. 

Reader mailbag: Dunedin plastic mountains edition

In the inbox, from our Professor of Finance:

Oh the irony - the 'sustainability' of recycling

Ratepayers are going to be charged more to keep producing a 'good' that nobody apparently wants or needs! Now that's certainly a 'sustainable' policy…

The ODT article forwarded me by the good Professor Glenn Boyle notes:

As a stockpile of the city's plastic waste grows ever bigger, the Dunedin City Council is being warned it may have to increase rates if returns from recycling do not improve.

The amount Dunedin people recycle has increased by a third since a new service was introduced in 2011.

That increase, combined with the high New Zealand dollar and a four-month stay on sending some plastics to the main Chinese market following a crackdown on contaminants in recyclables that has put traders off selling to China, resulted in the council running the service at a loss last year.

...The situation has prompted council solid waste manager Ian Featherston to warn the council this week that although the exchange rate was falling and new markets for the materials were being sought, the reduced target of a $210,000 return this financial year might also be difficult to achieve.

In that case, the kerbside recycling targeted rate would need to be increased next year from $64 to $69, he said.

Mr Featherston said Dunedin people recycle about 30 tonnes of material a month.

The stockpile of plastics being held had now reached about 150 tonnes.

Recycling programmes can still make sense even if they run at a loss, but only if the costs of disposing of this kind of plastic via the recycling system is lower than the costs of disposing of it via landfill. If it costs $30/tonne to get rid of waste at the landfill and the net costs of a recycling programme are $20/tonne, we're still $10/tonne better off by having it.

When I'd run some ballpark numbers on Christchurch's system in 2009, it looked like we were paying at least twice as much to get rid of waste via recycling, on average, as we were paying for disposal at Kate Valley. Some recyclables are of high value and are worth sending through a recycling system, but most of it is not worth the cost.

The numbers in Christchurch have likely changed with our newer bin system that separates out composting waste; the Otago numbers too could vary. I'd be surprised if it made sense to be stockpiling plastics in hopes of shipping them to China, but it's not impossible.

Tiki tours and useful idiots

Back during the Cold War, Western intellectuals were given guided tours of the Soviet Block and sent home to heap praise on the wonders achieved by Stalin. They were collectively called "useful idiots": too dumb to see through the Potemkin villages raised, but useful for internal and external state propaganda.

Last week, Liberty Scott started posting and tweeting on Gareth Morgan's motorcycle tour of North and South Korea. He pointed to numerous instances of Morgan's appearance being used in North Korean state media helping to legitimise the regime.

When I visited the DMZ on a USO tour back in 2007, we were given really strict instructions by the American military. Do not smile at the other side. Do not point. Do not do anything that the North Korean agents on the other side could photograph and print in their newspapers as "Westerner points to the Glorious North, admiring the wonders of Juche." I'm not generally all that keen on "do as I say" regs, but these ones made a lot of sense. One of the world's most evil regimes was staring back - literally, guys with binoculars and big-lens cameras - and I was publicity-shy.

But maybe playing the regime-supporting shill while there was needed so that he could have some chance at seeing what was going on.

Matt Nolan at TVHE yesterday pointed to Gareth Morgan's comments on his tour. Morgan wrote:

Having passed successfully through the demilitarised zone Gareth explains to the world’s media why the West’s “beat-up” view of North Korea is completely wrong.

Gareth and Jo and their group were free to set their own route through North Korea, witnessing at first hand the lives of ordinary North Koreans.

What they found surprised them – a people who were poor, yes, but wonderfully engaged, well-dressed, fully employed and well informed. In Gareth’s view, what North Korea has achieved economically despite its lack of access to international money has been magnificent.

He and Jo support active steps towards providing greater opportunities for ordinary Koreans from North and South to interact together – a goal of leaders from both North and South Korea. Hopefully, with enormous interest from the world media, this trip will be the catalyst for such a change.

Unbelievable. I'd thought that he was going to come out claiming that starvation works wonders on reducing feral cat numbers; this is worse.

Maybe there was some case for the tour somehow facilitating better North-South talks. Unlikely, but not impossible. But that the West has a "beat-up" view of North Korea? They have freaking concentration camps! Morgan's next tour could perhaps hit a few of those off-piste highlights. Morgan found the North Koreans with whom he spoke wonderfully well-informed; it's problematic even asking what that means in a place where preference-falsification is a necessary survival characteristic. As Xavier Marquez wrote:

There is a terrific story in Barbara Demick’s Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (pp. 97-101), which illustrates both how such control mechanisms can work regardless of belief and the degradation they inflict on people. The story is about a relatively privileged student, “Jun-sang,” at the time of the death of Kim Il-sung (North Korea’s “eternal president”). The death is announced, and Jun-sang finds that he cannot cry; he feels nothing for Kim Il-Sung. Yet, surrounded by his sobbing classmates, he suddenly realizes that “his entire future depended on his ability to cry: not just his career and his membership in the Workers’ Party, his very survival was at stake. It was a matter of life and death” (p. 98). So he forces himself to cry. And it gets worse: “What had started as a spontaneous outpouring of grief became a patriotic obligation … The inmiban [a neighbourhood committee] kept track of how often people went to the statue to show their respect. Everybody was being watched. They not only scrutinized actions, but facial expressions and tone of voice, gauging them for sincerity” (p. 101). The point of the story is not that nobody experienced any genuine grief at the death of Kim Il-sung (we cannot tell if Jun-sang’s feelings were common, or unusual) but that the expression of genuine grief was beside the point; all must give credible signals of grief or be considered suspect, and differences in these signals could be used to gauge the level of support (especially important at a time of leadership transition; Kim Il-sung had just died, and other people could have tried to take advantage of the opportunity if they had perceived any signals of wavering support from the population; note then the mobilization of the inmiban to monitor these signals). Moreover, the cult of personality induces a large degree of self-monitoring; there is no need to expend too many resources if others can be counted to note insufficiently credible signals of support and bring them to the attention of the authorities.

Even if Morgan was away from his handlers, everyone is a handler. That's the point of a totalitarian regime. Any disclosure can get you and your family sent to a concentration camp because somebody else will have purchased an indulgence by dobbing you in. And the safest course is making yourself believe the things you have to say.

Compare Gareth Morgan's visit with a couple other recent Western visits. Here's Neil Woodburn's travelogue. Here's what Curtis Melvin did while visiting North Korea, and subsequently. Melvin's mapping project would let Gareth Morgan check to see which prison camps he missed along his tour. Liberty Scott's update has some useful recommended readings as well.

Living wage mandates revisited

Two candidates for the Labour Party leadership have promised that they will require the payment of "living wages" for all government employees and for all government contractors. Matthew Hooton asked about the likely effects.

Were the government promising an $18.40 minimum wage across the board, things would be rather worse. The median hourly wage in the 2012 NZ Income Survey was $20.86. A minimum wage that's 88% of the median wage would be rather, well, breathtaking. Recall the median wage is the one where half of all wage earners earn more and half earn less. Workers vary in ability; a minimum wage at 88% of the median would disemploy anyone who cannot produce value equal to just a bit less than the median worker. This would obviously be very bad. Recall that unemployment weighs far more heavily in disutility than do wages. Chris Dillow made the case a few months ago. Those who want to improve the lot of the working poor do far better by pushing for wage subsidy schemes like Working For Families [New Zealand's EITC] than by making it too expensive to hire lower productivity workers.

The proposal here isn't for an $18.40 minimum wage but rather for a living wage mandate for government workers. The effects then are more minor. Imagine that we have rent control on a bunch of apartments but no rent control on new buildings. We'd then expect excess demand for the rent-controlled flats, but a clearing market elsewhere. Similarly, a living wage mandate in the government sector shouldn't have huge equilibrium unemployment effects. Lots of people queue for jobs in the high-paying sector, but they take lower-paying jobs in the private sector.

The main effect will be an increase in the cost of providing some government services. At the margin, this should mean that we have a few fewer things done by government, albeit within the context of an expansion in the size of government under a future Labour government. There would also then need to be an increase in taxes to fund it, or reduced spending in other areas to compensate, or higher deficits. I suspect Labour would bridge the gap via tax.

There will be some transitional unemployment as marginal jobs undertaken by government get shifted away from the government sector. If some of these workers were earning substantial rents in the government sector and are not employable above the legal minimum wage in the private sector, there could be some increased longer-term unemployment from that. But that shouldn't be any substantial part of the market. There will also be rather a few transitional costs where bureaus start renting fully serviced buildings with gardening and cleaning provided as part of the rent rather than either hiring those kinds of workers directly or through a contractor.

Another important effect: contractors will enjoy less of a cost advantage relative to government departments; we could easily read the policy as a way of trying to knock out contracted services to benefit public sector unions. See my discussion on the same issue when some city councils were talking about similar ideas. Some of my discussion of the likely effects of maximum wage gap mandates in government also apply.

Note as well that government sector workers are already overpaid relative to their private sector counterparts. While this may worsen the imbalance, it means that fewer government workers would be caught in the interval from the minimum to the proposed "living" wage than would be the case among private sector employees. The costs of a living wage mandate may be lower where imposed on the government sector than where imposed broadly. Imagine it in the limit: a $500/hour minimum wage in government. I expect that while government workers would earn a lot more, government would be a much smaller share of the economy. And think of the productivity gains in government: we'd only be choosing to use government rather than markets where we expected the social value of some government function were exceptionally high indeed.  

So while I wouldn't expect large disemployment effects from the policy, it's hardly a great idea. If you want to increase the wages of the working poor, you hardly should be starting with government workers, who earn more on average than those in the private sector and who typically also enjoy greater job security and flexibility. And if you want to run transfers to the working poor, generalised wage subsidies are the least distortionary way of doing it. Labour's proposed mechanism would be likely to reduce the efficiency of government services by pushing away from contracting out, and to skew the optimal balance between government services and other goods and services by increasing public sector costs.

Update: John Key also is no fan of Labour's proposal. He suggests additional costs where aggregate wages are bid up, or at least that's my interpretation of his argument that companies wind up having to pay more and that consumer costs then go up. That's possible within particular labour markets but I have a hard time seeing big aggregate effects.

Let's think of the market for service workers in restaurants. Suppose that the lowest-skilled workers work the cashier's station at the cafeteria in some government office. And let's suppose that this cafeteria continues to exist rather than the venue being leased out to a private sector firm, which it would under a $18.40 living wage mandate. The highest-skilled workers work at the fancy high-end restaurants, or work more complex jobs requiring a lot of balancing of tasks.

The living wage mandate then comes in. Currently employed cafeteria workers then are earning huge rents. Suppose we then have a lot of job applications from higher-skilled restaurant workers and, as consequence, job redefinitions to make better use of the more highly skilled staff. We then have more competition for more highly skilled restaurant staff and could see some bidding up of wages within that market. But there would still be low-skilled cafeterias in the private sector. With migration into that sector from former public sector workers who had been displaced, we could see some bidding down of wages in that part of the market. I can see mechanisms where there's bidding up of private sector wages in some markets, but I'd also expect potential bidding down where lower-tier government workers move back into the private sector.