On the surface there appears to be a lot in common with the Irish, Greek, and NZ economies. All three have high net foreign liability positions, liabilities are highly concentrated through banks who are borrowing overseas, all three have experienced some form of housing boom and lift in consumption, and finally all three appeared to have a relatively strong fiscal position before the GFC before moving into fiscal deficits after the shock. And yet (so far) while the Irish and Greek economies and banking systems have collapsed, New Zealand’s has been fine.Agreed.
There are two major differences that have helped reduce the implied risk on our debt, making New Zealand much less likely to experience a bank run:This is an important point to recognise. While many commentators are saying we should “peg” our dollar and set up more domestic ownership of banks GIVEN the risks associated with the GFC, I tend to reach the opposite conclusion – namely, the reason why we haven’t suffered as much as these countries as been largely the result of our free floating exchange rate and the fact that a larger economy has a large stake in our banking system.
- Our banking system is primarily foreign owned,
- We have a freely floating exchange rate – combined with having much of our debt denominated in NZ$ this is useful.
When Papaconstantinou arrived here, last October, the Greek government had estimated its 2009 budget deficit at 3.7 percent. Two weeks later that number was revised upward to 12.5 percent and actually turned out to be nearly 14 percent. He was the man whose job it had been to figure out and explain to the world why. “The second day on the job I had to call a meeting to look at the budget,” he says. “I gathered everyone from the general accounting office, and we started this, like, discovery process.” Each day they discovered some incredible omission. A pension debt of a billion dollars every year somehow remained off the government’s books, where everyone pretended it did not exist, even though the government paid it; the hole in the pension plan for the self-employed was not the 300 million they had assumed but 1.1 billion euros; and so on. “At the end of each day I would say, ‘O.K., guys, is this all?’ And they would say ‘Yeah.’ The next morning there would be this little hand rising in the back of the room: ‘Actually, Minister, there’s this other 100-to-200-million-euro gap.’ ”Wow. HT: Marginal Revolution [Update: autoqueued when Tyler first posted, now everybody's pointing to it. Oh well.]
This went on for a week. Among other things turned up were a great number of off-the-books phony job-creation programs. “The Ministry of Agriculture had created an off-the-books unit employing 270 people to digitize the photographs of Greek public lands,” the finance minister tells me. “The trouble was that none of the 270 people had any experience with digital photography. The actual professions of these people were, like, hairdressers.”
By the final day of discovery, after the last little hand had gone up in the back of the room, a projected deficit of roughly 7 billion euros was actually more than 30 billion. The natural question—How is this possible?—is easily answered: until that moment, no one had bothered to count it all up. “We had no Congressional Budget Office,” explains the finance minister. “There was no independent statistical service.” The party in power simply gins up whatever numbers it likes, for its own purposes.
Once the finance minister had the numbers, he went off to his regularly scheduled monthly meetings with ministers of finance from all the European countries. As the new guy, he was given the floor. “When I told them the number, there were gasps,” he said. “How could this happen? I was like, You guys should have picked up that the numbers weren’t right. But the problem was I sat behind a sign that said GREECE, not a sign that said, THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT.” After the meeting the Dutch guy came up to him and said, “George, we know it’s not your fault, but shouldn’t someone go to jail?”
As he finishes his story the finance minister stresses that this isn’t a simple matter of the government lying about its expenditures. “This wasn’t all due to misreporting,” he says. “In 2009, tax collection disintegrated, because it was an election year.”
“What?”
He smiles.
“The first thing a government does in an election year is to pull the tax collectors off the streets.”
“You’re kidding.”
Now he’s laughing at me. I’m clearly naïve.
“every single member of the Greek Parliament is lying to evade taxes.”The Germans must love paying for this.
“I hated discussing ideas with investors,” he said, “because I then become a Defender of the Idea, and that influences your thought process.” Once you became an idea’s defender, you had a harder time changing your mind about it.He tried setting up a separate company to raise more capital for bigger bets against subprime:
Oddly, as Mike Burry’s investors grew restive, his Wall Street counterparties took a new and envious interest in what he was up to. In late October 2005, a subprime trader at Goldman Sachs called to ask him why he was buying credit-default swaps on such very specific tranches of subprime-mortgage bonds. The trader let it slip that a number of hedge funds had been calling Goldman to ask “how to do the short housing trade that Scion is doing.” Among those asking about it were people Burry had solicited for Milton’s Opus—people who had initially expressed great interest. “These people by and large did not know anything about how to do the trade and expected Goldman to help them replicate it,” Burry wrote in an e-mail to his C.F.O. “My suspicion is Goldman helped them, though they deny it.” If nothing else, he now understood why he couldn’t raise money for Milton’s Opus. “If I describe it enough it sounds compelling, and people think they can do it for themselves,” he wrote to an e-mail confidant. “If I don’t describe it enough, it sounds scary and binary and I can’t raise the capital.” He had no talent for selling.You hear lots of rumblings about how financial innovations and credit default swaps are to blame for everything. If the Lewis piece is right, CDS provided the quickest way of going short on risky mortgage trenches that were overvalued.
If you are wealthy, buy a ticket on the black market. WARNING! In recent years the attitude of the Festival management has hardened not only towards the "scalpers" who trade in black-market tickets but also those who buy such tickets. A "scalper" is anyone who asks more for a ticket than its face value. The Festival management regard such tickets as void and invalid. There have been instances of individuals with black-market tickets being forcibly ejected from the Festspielhaus and in at least one case dragged from their seats. It is reported that offenders are advised to leave Bayreuth immediately and not to return. So if you use a black-market ticket, you must be prepared to be black-listed for life.The FAQ also notes that you can buy expensive package tours, including tickets, from approved agents. Sound familiar?
