Showing posts with label prohibition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label prohibition. Show all posts

Friday, 8 March 2024

Afternoon roundup

The afternoon's worthies:

Friday, 8 December 2023

A belated look at the coalition agreements

Things got a bit busy after the National-ACT and National-NZ First Coalition Agreements were released. 

A fair few things showed up in those agreements that we've been working on at the Initiative for rather some time, whether through reports, submissions, columns, panels and whatnot.

So that's been a bit busy, and I've been trying to clear through a few other bits before heading back to Canada and the US for a few weeks over the school holidays. So posting has been unduly light.

But I've been particularly pleased that these showed up in the agreements. 
A Rule of Two for Drug Certification

The government will require Medsafe to approve new pharmaceuticals within 30 days of them being approved by at least two overseas regulatory agencies recognised by New Zealand.

Loyal readers may recall series of tweets, blog posts, and columns from me on this one. I worked with a couple student teams at Canterbury to get a report up on the likely effects of a Rule of Two. 

It is in both coalition agreements and will be legislated. No "will investigate" or "will consider". It will happen. 

I am rather pleased about this one. 
Incentives for Growth

Weak incentives for councils to encourage housing development hasn't been the only problem blocking housing growth, but getting more housing despite current incentives requires heroes. And policy can't reliably depend on there being heroes around. The coalition agreements will introduce financial incentives for councils to enable more housing.

This has been core for the Initiative since before I got here. And now it will happen.

Easing Foreign Investment

The Overseas Investment Act will limit ministerial decision-making to national security concerns and make such decision-making more timely.

NZ has one of the OECD's most restrictive FDI regimes. Other places try to attract foreign investment; NZ does the opposite. 

Easing restrictions on FDI have been core for the Initiative since before I got here. Fingers crossed that the legislation interprets this as broadly as is implied by the text of the coalition agreements. 

Market Studies

Commerce Commission market studies will focus on reducing regulatory barriers to new entrants to drive competition. 

So far, ComCom has produced about one giant study per year. But the first-order problem is going to be in areas where ComCom has hitherto been precluded against poking around: matters falling under statutory exception. If a matter is authorised by Parliament, it doesn't get cartel investigation even if it is definitely behaving as a cartel. 

Instead of doing one giant study per year, ComCom would do a larger number of short studies focused simply on checking whether it is actually possible for a new entrant to get through NZ's regulatory and land use hurdles to provide potential competition. 

So here I disagree with my friend Donal Curtin. He worries about instances where the issue isn't regulatory barriers. Maybe I'll agree with Donal after the revised regime has run for a few years. But the low-hanging fruit simply is not going to be in places where ComCom has been able to use other tools. It will be in the place where they've been unable to shorten the way.

This shift in approach is something I've argued for in columns, submissions, at a CLIPNZ session, and in various conversations around town. 

Ben Hamlin and I have been, I think, the only ones really worried about the statutory exceptions. Ben's piece on it in the latest Law Review is very good; his gratuitous citing of my columns is inframarginal to that assessment. 

Monetary Policy

The Remit will be narrowed to focus only on price stability.

This too is excellent. In a normal environment, a dual mandate shouldn't matter. The long-run Philips curve is vertical. Maintaining price stability is the best way the bank has to ensure maximum sustainable long-term employment. 

We have worried about the broad Remit, which includes a preamble that encourages the Bank to give regard to basically the entirety of the government's policy agenda, for some time. 

Employment 

The government will consider setting an income threshold above which a personal grievance could not be pursued.

Our Chair, Roger Partridge, has been writing on this for some time. The measure would make it far simpler for firms to dismiss underperforming high-paid managers who really aren't the people that employment law protections should focus on anyway. 

Pseudoephedrine

The government will allow the sale of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine.

This is another one that loyal readers may recognise. I think me and Twitter's @BoxcarJoey have been the only ones making the case for this obviously sensible move. And now it will happen. 

There's a lot of other stuff in the agreements, mostly good, some less good. 

As another bit of fun, the Dom Post put out its latest 'Wellington Power' list. I think it needs an accompanying 'Wellington Mystery' list so we can figure out whose power is exceeded only by their mystery, or vice-versa, or both, somehow, simultaneously. 

But in any case, I made the cut for inclusion this time. But only barely. And possibly only because I also write a column for them. 
45. Eric Crampton

The stocks of think tank New Zealand Initiative’s chief economist have soared, with the ascendancy of ACT into Government. The Canadian is a prolific report-writer and commentator, with a free market bent, and incoming ministers are sure to be paying attention to his sharp, original (and often witty) thinking.

Tuesday, 26 September 2023

The price of meth

ACT has proposed lifting the de-facto ban on the only cold medicine that seems to work - pseudoephedrine.

It's about freaking time.

National and Labour both expressed openness to the idea of rescheduling it. So that's good. 

This week's column over in Newsroom ($ today, ungates tomorrow if you pull the /pro from the URL) goes through a bit of the history on this one. 

It's a weird one. When Key's National-led government set the ban, they put evaluation frameworks around it. It was part of a meth action plan. They had indicators on purity, price, availability. The set of policies was meant to reduce use and availability. Use did ultimately decline, but not because of anything obvious on the supply side. The ban on cold medicine had only a minor effect on availability, price and purity - the supply indicators. And you kinda have to squint to even see those. Over the longer term, price dropped and availability increased. 

And rather than ditch the restrictions, the government shifted from six-monthly progress reports on its action plan to an annual report, to no reports. 

The supply side policy had failed. The ban on cold medicine worked only until suppliers figured out how to get methamphetamine into the country properly. Meth suppliers had been importing cold tablets, in bulk, before pseudoephedrine was made prescription-only. They continued to import cold tablets after the policy change. But finished methamphetamine was being imported at levels never before seen – or at least was being seized in unprecedented quantities. Rather than abandon the policy, the government abandoned the reports. The October 2015 annual report was the final report in the series.

Things didn’t improve after those reports ended. Other reports continued. By 2017/18, the national median price of methamphetamine had dropped to $500 per gram, with record low prices in Auckland, Waikato, and Wellington. Prices increased with total border closures to control Covid, but normalised soon after. One News reported in June that meth cost $400 a gram.

On average, the price of everything is 38 percent higher than it was in 2009. But the price of methamphetamine has dropped by more than 40 percent, despite none of us having reasonable access to cold medicines. If meth were in the CPI, the Reserve Bank’s job would be easier.

The official reports rather clearly establish that the ban on effective access to cold medicine had at most a small temporary effect on the supply of meth. It was obvious, rather quickly, that the ban was not helping. But the ban remained in place.

That is a terrible failure, albeit on a smallish margin. The government had set all of the evaluation frameworks needed for justifying a change in course, should one prove warranted. But it did not see fit to do so when the data came in. It stuck with the bad policy.

I like the idea of meth being in the CPI. 

But I even more like the idea of regular reviews of regulation to wipe out ones that impose cost while having no discernable benefit. 

Oh - FWIW - there are some conflicting sources on the price of meth in 2020. A Parliamentary snapshot had it having doubled to over $1000/gram; the regular survey had it fall. Perhaps there was a limited-time period in which price went through the roof? I covered my bases by saying prices increased with border closures and normalised soon after. 

But just look at this. Despite inflation over the period, meth dropped from over $700/gram to about $400/gram. 



I suppose a prohibitionist might claim that the price would be even lower if it were easier to access home cooking supplies, but really? It's imported at scale as finished product. It seems a bit like worrying that legalising the sale of car parts will lead to people building their own utes to get around the tax on utes. 

Update: the official reports, when they were tracking things, were here. There was one (1) annual report produced after the shift to annual reporting. 




Tuesday, 27 June 2023

More black market scaremongering

None of this can really be happening. It has to be fake news. Or somehow generated by the tobacco industry. Remember? Janet Hoek told us. Black markets are just tobacco-funded scaremongering. 

A dramatic influx of illegal vapes into Australia is distracting border force officials from stopping guns and illicit drugs from entering the country.

And the inundation of vapes has led the Australian Border Force to call out for more workers to fulfil the Federal Government’s demands of detecting, storing and disposing of every illegal e-cigarette.

The West Australian understands the high volume of vapes being imported has taken up border force staff’s time because they are required to refer e-cigarettes without a prescription to the Therapeutic Goods Administration.

Sources aware of the process say it is time-consuming and is diverting workers away from other priorities such as seizing smuggled weapons and drugs.

Limited and costly transport and storage capacity has created further issues as the agency is required to hold the products while a decision is being made by the TGA. The products are either then destroyed or released to the owner after samples are tested.

Ok. Maybe it's happening. But there's no way that tobacco and nicotine prohibitionists are to blame. That's just tobacco industry scaremongering.  

New regulations came into place under the Morrison Government in 2021 where any nicotine product hitting Australian shores without a prescription from a local doctor is seized and referred to the TGA for laboratory analysis to see if it contains nicotine.

The Albanese Government has gone a step further — last month announcing a plan to ban imports of recreational vapes at the border, which means those that do not contain nicotine, in the hope it will stamp out the black market.

A Border Force spokesman told The West the organisation required more staff with the calls coming before the new reforms have been implemented.

“As with any legislative change, an alteration to border controls will have a significant impact to ABF frontline resources and will require an uplift in our capability and capacity to detect, store and dispose of products containing nicotine safely,” the spokesman said.

The only possible conclusion is that Australian border officials are beholden to Big Tobacco. I can't wait for the expose on it from Hoek. I'm sure The Conversation will publish it for her.  

Thursday, 26 May 2022

Morning roundup

Another closing of the browser tabs, including a couple from Auckland University's Prof Robert MacCulloch, who's caught a few things I'd missed.


Thursday, 19 May 2022

Morning roundup

The computer begs to be rebooted. But the tabs...

  • There's an underlying demand-side problem to misinformation. You can't con an honest man...

  • Some days, I love our Environment Minister. Here's David Parker giving Auckland Council a deserved slap for nonsense around character designations. People who want to protect character are "entitled to do that in respect to their own property. But in other parts of their suburb, there will be areas where more intensive housing will and should be built." EXACTLY!! If only central government would fix the incentives that encourage councils to do this...

  • New Zealand regime around medicinal cannabis remains a broken mess. I think it was allowed to fall into disrepair on expectation that legalisation would be coming and make it redundant. It has to be very frustrating for anyone who needs cannabis as treatment, and anyone who wants to supply it. The Newsroom column is gated today, but I think will ungate tomorrow if you pull out the /pro from the link. In addition to all the other problems, medicinal cannabis suppliers have a tough time finding banking or insurance. 

  • Kate MacNamara keeps digging on the messes around Covid testing regulation. Just impossibly frustrating. You can use a LAMP test to meet the testing requirements to fly to NZ. It's way more accurate than a RAT. But they're banned in NZ. If you try begging permission to use one here just to give some added assurance before going to visit a vulnerable relative, the Government just doesn't answer. Vogons would give the MoH an award for being more Vogon than anything they'd ever come up with. 

  • One problem for all the "let's base policy on happiness" people at Treasury and elsewhere: the measures are crap and you can't do anything with them. Here's Bond & Lang, JPE 2019:
    "The necessary conditions for nonparametric identification are strong and unlikely to ever be satisfied. Standard parametric approaches cannot identify this ranking unless the variances are exactly equal. If not, ordered probit findings can be reversed by lognormal transformations. For nine prominent happiness research areas, conditions for nonparametric identification are rejected and standard parametric results are reversed using plausible transformations."
    If you can just run a plausible transformation on the dependent variable to reverse a result, you've got another degree of freedom to justify whatever policy you'd wanted to rationalise. 

  • National Party leader Chris Luxon says he doesn't like corporate welfare in the climate response. Good! But the ETS revenues are hypothecated. Does he support putting them back into general revenues? Or, better, would he support a carbon dividend? I like National's emphasis on an ETS led approach, but that's harder if you don't rebate ETS revenues back to households. If he's not going to, he should promise to end the hypothecation that's let Robertson have a slush fund. 

  • Princeton no longer supports academic freedom.

  • Regulatory regimes can embed fragility against shocks. NZ building materials supply, US baby formula...
Ok. I think I can reboot now. 

Wednesday, 20 April 2022

Morning roundup

The morning's worthies. 

R0 on tabs is high. 

Monday, 5 July 2021

Morning roundup

The morning's closing of the browser tabs:

Thursday, 1 July 2021

Supply chains in illicit markets

Credibly certifying that a product's supply chain meets particular standards is not the easiest thing in the world. 

Every supplier all the way back in the chain needs to be so-certified, and there will always be fun boundary questions in how far back things need to go. For something like a t-shirt there's the factory that makes them, the factories that makes the thread and the cloth, the places that make the dyes, the sources of the raw materials and the chemical components that go into the dyes, the people who make the machines that extract the raw materials, the company that makes the fuel for the machines and the electricity suppliers. Maybe also the companies that supply morning tea for the workers and back through that chain as well? It gets messy. 

Anyway - certification is possible, but setting it all up in the first place has to have been hard. It requires that those at the end of the chain can trust that the next one back in the chain is also certified, which requires that they can trust the next steps back, and so on. Knowing that your certified supplier is legit requires either having some centralised repository of who is certified maintained by the certification provider, or the ability to see the certifications all the way through. Encouraging any one supplier to be certified requires that they all expect to see the increase in value from being able to cell through verified certified chains, so there are network issues to overcome too. 

It seems the kind of thing that would be close to impossible in cocaine markets. But:

Brits looking to ease their conscience over their involvement in bloody drug wars overseas are now being targeted by cynical dealers selling what they claim is "ethically sourced" cocaine.

Users have revealed a high demand for the so-called "woke coke" at posh dinner parties across the UK.

Drug policy expert Neil Woods told the Daily Mirror: "I have been shown ads for 'environmentally friendly sniff' but it's nothing but a very clever marketing ploy.

He revealed that users were paying through the nose for the gimmick.

The article quotes someone as saying it's impossible to produce ethical cocaine. 

That seems wrong, at least in principle. 

But imagine if you did have some perfectly ethical way of producing cocaine. How could you possibly credibly convey that through the many steps between you and the final consumer in London? At every step, someone could be mixing your product with someone else's cheaper and less ethical product. Any mechanisms you might put in place for verifying the authentic source of the delivered cocaine is a mechanism by which you might be prosecuted. Even if you ran it pseudonymously, it increases the risk you're running if the pseudonym gets tied to a real identity. 

I'd love to know how the cocaine dealers in London are trying to demonstrate that their product is actually the ethical real deal. It could be that the customers don't actually care and they just want the warm glow of feeling like they do care. But suppose there were an actual real market with people willing to pay a real premium for ethical cocaine. Could that market be supplied? Or does it just fall apart with lemons problems? 

In any case, ethical supply will be easier in legal than in illegal markets, so another case for legalisation. 

Tuesday, 15 June 2021

Smokefree 2025

The Government's proposed approach for achieving SmokeFree 2025 is a bit over-the-top. 

The proposals would restrict tobacco sales to a smaller number of to-be-licenced R18 outlets, which could then be subject to a sinking lid; impose an annual one-year increase in the purchase age for tobacco until full prohibition were achieved; restrict nicotine content in cigarettes to very low levels; prohibit filters in cigarettes; impose minimum cigarette pricing; and further restrict flavourings.

In short, the only way to get a proper cigarette would be through the black market. The Ministry's betting on folks shifting more heavily to vaping or heated tobacco. I'd expect instead that imposing all this stuff would have smokers flip to black-market excise-free cigarettes, and that smokers would be less likely to switch from those to vaping. I also wonder whether some smokers might try soaking loose tobacco in nicotine e-liquid to get the nicotine levels up, and I don't know what smoking that stuff winds up doing. Heating is different than combustion. 

Our submission on the consultation document went through a couple of weeks ago; have been a bit pressed and hadn't gotten around to blogging it. 

But it has been fun watching more stories of black market tobacco coming though. Sometimes they're sold for organised crime groups; sometimes they're sold as church fundraisers. Loose tobacco is fungible like that. 

All the talk about prohibition reminds me that I have forgotten to tell you something else important. The new season of Cocaine & Rhinestones is up. It's Tyler Mahan Coe's podcast of the history of country music, and it's superb. 

Episode 4 is on prohibition and the leadup to George Jones's White Lightning

He goes through the rather evil history, not forgetting the part where the federal government poisoned industrial alcohol and murdered a pile of people who'd previously been filtering the bad tasting stuff out of industrial alcohol. But also the history of the whisky rebels before that. Great stuff. Recommended.

In other words, the U.S. government empowered a bunch of thugs to enforce organized crime’s monopoly on illegal alcohol distribution in most major markets of the nation. This is how Chicago came under the thumb of Al Capone, who was targeted by Elliot Ness and his Untouchables, yes… But this unit of officers were called “untouchable” because of their surprising ability to resist the near-universal corruption laid bare by Prohibition.

Beats me why the New Zealand government expects better results out of tobacco prohibition.  

Tuesday, 6 October 2020

The cannabis referendum

I hope that the cannabis referendum passes. It isn't the legislation I'd have written, but it is preferable to prohibition. 

Last week, The Helen Clark Foundation and the Initiative co-hosted a webinar with The Brookings Institution's John Hudak, author of Marijuana: A Short History, about America's experience with legalisation. 

You can catch it below. 



There's been a lot of misinformation about what would be allowed under the proposed legislation. I covered some of that in this week's column for the Stuff newspapers

A snippet:
The main scare stories really do not hold up. The legalisation experience abroad counters many of them; the restrictiveness of New Zealand’s proposed framework puts paid to much of the rest.

If you are not certain about any aspect of the bill, it is all easily checked. But a fairly simple heuristic can also work. Just imagine the bill was drafted by people who deeply mistrust business and commerce, who hate advertising, who are not all that keen on cannabis consumption in any case, and whose ideal cannabis operation would be a small non-profit community-based cooperative that employs people from underprivileged communities. Any provisions you might imagine would be drafted by that kind of group will not be far from how the bill really looks.

I worry that this makes for a bit of a problem. Social conservatives have very good ways of overcoming collective action problems. Where the Bill makes it rather difficult for any kind of larger businesses to get involved, you'll be less likely to draw any substantial industry funding in support of legalisation. 

I also worry a bit that the bill doesn't do much to make it easier for employers needing to deal with a worker who shows up impaired. It's less a problem in the US, because it's rather easier to fire workers there. Here, it could be an issue:

That also leads to a bit of a problem, even if your ideal cannabis operation looks like the kind of business likely to be authorised and licensed under this draft legislation. How can employers whose workplaces involve risky activities like heavy machine operation ensure that they can maintain appropriate health and safety regimes, while not running into trouble with employment law?

It is a difficult circle to square.

Employees should have the right, in a legalised environment, to consume cannabis on the weekend. But employers should be able to discipline workers who show up to work while impaired. The bill does little to enable the latter.

Proving that an employee is impaired can be difficult. Workplace drug testing is a poor indicator of on-the-job impairment; cannabis use over the prior weekend can too easily be caught in those tests if the threshold is set at a low level. Further, if an employee’s terms of initial employment did not include provision for drug testing, it can be difficult to add those provisions later.

Prohibition makes it risky for workers to show up to work while impaired, the consequences could be worse than an angry boss. Removing that constraint, while not providing better ways for employers to ensure on-the-job safety, can make for a problem.

I hope the cannabis referendum passes, and that the bill is brought to Parliament. When Parliament considers the bill at committee, it should also think on how to balance workplace health and safety requirements. Making it easier for employers to add testing requirements to employment contracts may help.

Wednesday, 6 May 2020

Almost anything beats prohibition, including the draft cannabis legislation

The draft cannabis legislation, as written, is better than prohibition. Even without amendment, those inclined to vote should vote for it.

There's still a lot in it that I don't like though.

The prohibition on growers also running retail operations, presumably intended to prevent large commercial grow operations with vertically integrated retailers, will also prevent anyone from running the kinds of cellar-door operations that have been very important in wine tourism.

Sure, cannabis is nothing like wine. But is it that hard to imagine folks spending a morning at a grower's in Northland, seeing he fields, meeting the growers and workers, touring the facilities, sampling some of the product , having a bit of lunch maybe with a nice wine, ordering some for delivery back home, then bicycling over to tour a different one in the afternoon?

A whole lot of that would be illegal under the legislation as drafted.

The grower is not allowed to run a licensed consumption facility. Licensed consumption facilities are not allowed also to have alcohol. And prohibitions on advertising would likely make it hard even to put up a normal product list with descriptions and prices within the shop. The names of products and prices are fine; any additional notes wouldn't be.

Russell Brown, who's more a fan of the legislation than I am, also worries about this part
The bottom line of the section quoted above also embodies a more recent approach: a ban on vertical integration, which has been an element of reform in Mexico. No business will be able to both produce cannabis and sell it to the consumer, which restricts market dominance.

The economist Eric Crampton has already noted that the vertical integration ban would preclude “cellar door” type operations, where a producer could show and sell farm-grown cannabis to visitors (which would undoubtedly be popular with tourists). But I think there are larger impediments to that, most notably in the banket ban on advertising – including advertising inside R20 stores. You won’t be able to smell or see your weed – or even a picture of it – just a price list.

It’s not clear to me the extent to which even attributes of of the products will be able to be described, to tight is the advertising ban. But the particular effects of any given cannabis strain strain are governed as much by which terpenes are present as by THC level – weed that smells like cheese will have a very different effect to weed that smells like piney or citrusy, believe or or not – and anyone buying it needs some way of knowing that.

I do think there’s a level where this gets infantilising. If we’ve decided, as a nation, that adults can use this drug, then not letting them see it or get information about it, even on licensed premises, until they’ve bought it – when they will be free to look at it, smell it and consume it, even right there on the spot – just seems a bit silly.
And the cap on the quantity of cannabis that can be sold in the commercial market will make it very hard for the market to respond to changes in demand that can come with, for example, the return of tourism. Quantity restrictions will push prices up whenever demand is higher than normal, and that will encourage shifts back into the illegal or informal market. If the government had any intention of setting excise to try to maintain retail prices to consumers around where they are now, it'll be harder to do that under the quantity restriction.

The cap is likely to turn into a sinking lid where the cap is supposed to be set with a view to the purposes of the Act and the Harm Reduction Strategy, all of which focus on minimising the harms of use.

The Authority has to decide among potential growers vying for a share of the annual production cap. They're meant to take into account factors listed in Section 85, including representation of communities traditionally harmed by cannabis, generation of social benefits and employment.

Those applications come in for the share of the annual cap, so every year there will be costly application processes trying to prove the social worthiness of one grower relative to another.

There's no mention of potential tradeability of permits; it's presumably prohibited where the point of the permitting process is to make sure that the portions of the cap are divvied up according to the preferences of the Authority as guided by the Act. But that also could cause problems if a grower experiences crop failure in one year, for example. With wine, if one part of the country has a great year and another part is a bit average, it all washes out. If there's drought hitting apples in Hawkes' Bay but Central Otago's fine, then we get apples from Central instead. Nobody has to reallocate permits in accordance with social worthiness.

This whole thing looks rather ripe for rent-seeking.

And while the regime at least doesn't punish those under the age limit for being in possession of cannabis - or at least avoids criminalising them - it would criminalise social supply to 19 year olds in cases where, for example, a parent may prefer to provide a bit from their own home-grown supply than have the kid rely on informal supply from less savoury folks. Sure, in theory, illicit supply's supposed to be wiped out. But suppose you have an 18 year old at home that you know is getting weed elsewhere and that it's dodgy-as. Unless you're able to find and dob in the kid's supplier, you can't really block that access route. And you can't supply small amounts of better product for supervised consumption.

And if you regularly have guests over who consume cannabis, be careful about Section 177: you could be considered to be running an unlicensed premise for the purpose of cannabis consumption even if no money changes hands.

On the good side though:

  • Excise would be based on weight and potency rather than ad valorem;
  • Edibles will be allowed - though I don't see any mention of the standard-dose kinds of packaging that have been useful elsewhere;
  • There's a review 5 years into the regime to see how it's working;
  • It isn't as bad as prohibition. 

Tuesday, 14 May 2019

Morning roundup

This morning's worthies on the closing of the browser tabs:

Thursday, 2 May 2019

Markets and meth

Damian Christie expects worries that allowing pharmacy sales of pseudoephedrine would see an increase in meth supply, or at least a resumption of home cooking.

I'll work through my logic here; y'all can tell me what I've messed up.

Prior to the ban on pseudoephedrine,* folks would go from pharmacy to pharmacy buying up enough cold medicine to start cooking, then they'd use that to make meth. Under that system, pre-2009, meth sold for about $700 per gram. That price would reflect the cost of materials, the hassle of collecting them, the time involved in cooking, compensation for the expertise involved in cooking, the costs of sourcing a site for cooking, and a hefty risk premium for being involved in an illegal market.

Since the ban, the market has shifted to importation of finished product. That finished product sells at less than $500 per gram.

I think that some of the disagreement here comes from how we're viewing costs and prices.

If you think that the underlying 'real' cost of home-cooking meth is just the cost of getting pseudoephedrine (buying it, time spent walking from pharmacy to pharmacy), the cost of additional chemicals, and maybe a bit of compensation for the cook's time, then it's easy to imagine being able to undercut the $500/gram price. So allowing pharmacies to start selling the stuff again then sounds risky.

But if that were the case, why wasn't there massive entry into p manufacturing prior to 2009? If there were decent returns to be had at a $500/gram price point, the profits at $700/gram would have been substantially higher. Why wasn't the price of meth, back in 2009, bid down to $500/gram or less if there were still substantial profits there to be made?

To me, evidence of 2008 prices well in excess of current prices suggests strongly there would be no substantial resumption of cooking meth from pseudoephedrine if we again legalised the decent cold medication. The current supply chain is able to deliver meth to consumers at a much lower price point than the previous supply arrangement. That suggests the costs involved in the current supply chain are far lower than the costs under the prior regime.

Potential objections, and I think there are some potentially good ones:
  1. If that's all true, why didn't they adopt the current supply chain earlier? 
  2. There could have been a generalised reduction in risk premiums in meth that has hit all potential ways of running a meth supply chain. 
  3. Prices also reflect industry organisation. Ex ante prices depended on local cartel behaviour enforced by local gangs. Current structure may differ from that. So the 2008 prices were propped up by the prevention of entry enforced by the gangs. 
  4. Something else I haven't thought of.
Ok.

The first one I owe to Paul Walker on Twitter. There are a few potential reasons why the 2008 meth supply chain hadn't shifted to the current supply chain. Local gangs may have lacked international supply contacts, and may have worked to keep out potential entry by international players. There could have been fairly substantial fixed costs in establishing those supply chains that none of the 2008 players were willing or able to front. Perhaps someone who knows more about the local industry can help fill in the blanks here.

The second one - imagine that the police just kinda gave up on meth. They stopped reporting on progress on meth back in 2015, when it was looking pretty obvious that the drugs had won the drug war. If they gave up, then it would be cheaper to cook meth from pseudoephedrine now than it was in 2008, so that product could be delivered at a lower price point. Alternatively, if there have been tech developments in small-batch cooking that have radically lowered the cost of production in that sector since 2008, then 2008 prices may not be the best guide. If that's happened, and someone can point me to evidence on it, that'd be helpful. In either of those cases, you could see a re-emergence of a local industry making meth out of cold medicine.

Finally, industry organisation. Imagine that, pre-2008, we had a monopoly gang running meth supply. Imagine it controlled everything and restricted supply to keep prices up. The early prices then reflected monopoly profits rather than just real production costs and real risk premiums. But for that to affect the relative cost of importing meth versus cooking it from pharmacy medicines, the switch in the supply chain would also have had to have broken the cartel/monopoly. In that case, current prices are competitive; prior prices were inflated by monopoly/cartel profits; and, relative prices between the two points don't tell us about the relative costs of the two production methods. If we still had a monopoly importer/distributor that just flipped supply chains, the lower price would reflect monopoly profit maximisation under a lower cost structure. It feels like you need the current model to be far more competitive than the prior model to reckon out of this that cooking meth from cold medicine might have any cost advantage. And that just seems odd when the prior model had lots of small scale folks buying cold medicine and the current one has more sophisticated import methods.

It just doesn't seem plausible that small-batch cooking is in any way cost-competitive with the meth that's currently imported. There are mechanisms that can get you there, but they just seem far less likely than the rather simpler model: it's just gotten a heck of a lot easier to import methamphetamine out of Asia that's reportedly of better purity.

Bottom line: my odds-on expectation is that a resumption of pharmacy sales of pseudoephedrine-based cold medicine would not see any substantial re-emergence of that way of making meth. There might be a few cases here and there of folks giving it a go for their own supply or a bit of social supply, but they'd have a tough time competing with current imports - unless something happened to make importing meth a lot harder.




* Yes I know that it's still available by prescription. But that's a ban in all but name. If the worst of a cold takes 48 hours to pass and it takes 48 hours to get a doctor's appointment to get a prescription, you just can't get decent cold medication when you get a cold. You have to have a doctor willing to provide a prescription in case you get a cold later, and a pharmacist willing to fill the prescription, and the hassle of setting a doctor's appointment, and the cost of a doctor's appointment.

Tuesday, 30 April 2019

The Price of Meth

Back in 2011, New Zealand's drug warriors claimed a success in their war on methamphetamine. The price of meth had risen. 
The report shows the price of P has been steadily moving upwards since 2006, and remains high. The latest survey data shows the mean price of a gram of P is $768, up from $723 at the same time in 2010.

"However, this is not the time for sitting on our laurels. While the price of P has risen dramatically in Christchurch, we are seeing fluctuations around the country. While we are seeing progress, it's more important than ever for authorities to continue to be vigilant."

The nature of seizures at New Zealand's borders is continuing to change. Seizure levels of precursor chemicals, like ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, are down 44 per cent compared to the same time last year. In contrast, seizures of methamphetamine are rising. In the first nine of months of 2011, 23 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized at the border - nearly 95 per cent of the total seized during 2010.
At the time, I wondered how much of that increase was CPI and the GST increase. Sure, you don't pay GST on meth directly, but neither do meth dealers get to claim back the GST on any of their legally purchased inputs.

Whatever the case then, the Herald today reports that meth costs $500 per gram in Auckland and $600 per gram in Christchurch.

Maybe it would be even more prevalent if we again had easy access to pseudoephedrine over the counter, but it seems unlikely. It seems rather that drug dealers have figured out better ways of getting meth into the country.

If making meth out of pseudoephedrine got us to a price point per gram of about $700 in 2008, before the ban, it seems unlikely that anybody's going to go back to that way of making meth if their current supply methods get to a price point of $500-$600 per gram.

Can we please un-ban pseudoephedrine for over-the-counter purchase? The continued ban is just stupid.

Doesn't the government claim to have some wellbeing-based agenda? If that's about more than playing card games at Treasury and adopting trendy vocabulary, this seems an obvious cost-effective way of improving wellbeing. One line of regulation flipping pseudoephedrine out of Class B2 and back into its prior pharmacy-medicine status. Costs the government nothing and makes everyone with a cold a bit better off.

Update: A source in Christchurch who would know tells me that the quoted price in Christchurch is "way wrong Haha" - on the high side. Christchurch prices are lower than the Herald there quotes - though it notes those were the prices at the time of the survey. The earlier numbers come from a more comprehensive drug price survey; the Herald doesn't say where the researcher drew the more current price figures from.

Wednesday, 16 January 2019

Afternoon roundup

This afternoon's worthies on closing out the accumulated browser tabs:

Monday, 14 January 2019

Good character?

National's associate health spokesman Shane Reti said medicinal cannabis manufacturers and employees should be "fit and proper persons".

National has proposed clean slate legislation requiring no terms of imprisonment and no convictions for seven years for employees, and even tougher standards for licence holders including no associations with gangs.

"The industry was adamant that it understood the need to be absolutely squeaky clean in this new industry and they were up for that," Reti said.
David Farrar suggests it is appropriate that those in the industry have no convictions within the past seven years.

I keep saying the best approach to cannabis legalisation is to look at alcohol and see whether the rules there would work for cannabis. For alcohol, a license applicant's suitability matters:
Suitability of an applicant may take into account: business or industry knowledge to effectively operate a licensed premises; recent experience in the industry; criminal history, association with undesirable people, or previous behaviour relating to the sale of alcohol. Suitability of the applicant is an issue that Police considers in the investigation of licence applications as it has access to information not generally available to the public. However, community groups can provide information that may not be available to Police.

Where an existing licence is being renewed with no changes to conditions, the suitability of the applicant will be the only ground for objection.
I would expect that this, applied to cannabis, should mean that people with current gang affiliations would not be deemed suitable, that those with criminal histories not relating to cannabis would not be deemed suitable unless they had cleaned up their act, and that those whose prior offending related only to the sale, supply, or possession of cannabis should be deemed suitable. I would also expect that the licensing authority would weigh things up as a whole for any applicant.

So I would hope that someone who had a criminal record as a drug dealer would not be excluded from being a potential licensee. Otherwise, I'd hope that the licensing authority just uses the same kind of criteria it uses when deciding on alcohol licensees. A new licensee's prior expertise with cannabis should count positively, rather than negatively, in that evaluation.

It would be manifestly unjust if those who have been most harmed by prohibition were locked out of a newly legal industry in which they have developed some expertise. 

Wednesday, 5 December 2018

Cannabis reform

Russell Brown's take on cannabis law reform over at RNZ:
Yet, the CRC may still learn lessons from what's happened abroad. Alison Holcomb, the criminal justice director of American Civil Liberties Union in Washington state, who helped design the successful initiative there seven years ago, says that "voters responded strongly to messages that reassured them about tight control of this novel policy experiment. Messages about freedom and individual rights fell flat. I continue to believe that acknowledging basic human nervousness about change is always important."

Tamar Todd, legal director of the Drug Policy Alliance, who jointly authored California's Proposition 64, says voters in her state wanted reassurance in detail. That's what they got: the full text of Proposition 64 ran to more than 100,000 words of legal and technical definitions and proposed amendments to laws and regulations, together making up the Adult Use of Marijuana Act.
This is one reason I think we should be modelling cannabis legalisation on our existing framework for supply and sale of spirits. There is no time before the referendum to write up the kind of detail provided in Prop 64. But we could adapt our existing framework.