Showing posts with label trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trade. Show all posts

Thursday, 25 January 2024

Afternoon roundup

Sure doesn't take long for the tabs to pile up after summer break.

Some worthies:

Wednesday, 23 August 2023

Morning roundup

The morning's worthies:

Thursday, 20 April 2023

Service exports and the NZ current account

I've never worried much about current account balances. If you have a flexible exchange rate, it sorts itself out. 

But my excellent colleague Bryce Wilkinson points to one of the reasons for the current large current account deficit.

Just look at this.


Service exports, as percent of GDP, dropped to levels we haven't seen since the 70s. 

Borders closed in 2020 - for good reason.

Mid 2020, the Universities had decent plans for running their own quarantine facilities - or at least ones that could be built on. Government said no. International student numbers collapsed. Before Covid, we had around 120,000 international students. In 2022, less than 15,000. [Note that those numbers won't just be university though.]

Every course taught to an international student is the export of a service. International students paid ridiculously high fees that cross-subsidise domestic students and research. And contribute to the export of service figures that feed into the current account numbers. 

We put up a proposal for scaling MIQ. Shift MoH/MBIE from running the system to setting and enforcing standards, and let the system scale up. There was incredible opportunity. We could have been *the* place where students still had in-person lectures. And where professionals able to work remotely could move, work, live freely, get paid by their home-country employers while contributing to the economy here. 

Government said no.

International tourism ended. Every dollar spent by an international tourist was the export of a service. 

Anyway, just a bit of backstory on why the current account numbers are as they are. 

Thursday, 10 November 2022

Morning Roundup

The tabs...

Thursday, 10 December 2020

Island logistics

I'm a bit curious about logistics over on the Islands now.

RNZ writes:

Ten containers of watermelons were scheduled to be shipped to New Zealand on 5 December.

However, the trucking companies assigned to transport the melons to the wharf in Tongatapu did not arrive to the growers' farms to pick up the produce, as RNZ Pacific Correspondent Kalafi Moala explained.

"The government, in particular the Ministry of Agriculture had organised for the trucks to come pick up the melons and so the fact that it didn't happen over the weekend, the responsibility falls back on them," he said.

Why is the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for organising freight logistics there?

If a grower contracts with a trucking company for critical deliveries like this, I'd have expected penalty clauses for failures. I have no clue what to expect when the Tongan government is intermediary.

Tuesday, 25 August 2020

Protecting the Canadian Dairy Cartel

Canada might not be playing fair under the CPTPP. 

Here's Farmer's Weekly:

In the two years since the agreement came into force low-tariff and tariff-free quota created to open their markets to more imports of dairy products have gone largely unfilled.

Canada has been the worst offender, with just 12% of quota for dairy imports from CPTPP countries filled last year and just 4% so far this year.

In Japan just 40% of dairy quotas have been filled while fill rates have also disappointed in Mexico.

Dairy Companies Association of NZ executive director Kimberly Crewther said administrative foot-dragging by the three countries’ governments, along with President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2017, meant the $96m of annual gains predicted for the industry once CPTPP was fully implemented now looked unachievable.

Not a particular surprise that the Canadian government would pull whatever tricks it could to support the dairy cartel.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was aware of the problem and raised it with Canadian, Mexican and Japanese counterparts and was due to do so again at an online meeting of CPTPP officials last week.

Crewther said it was disappointing but not unusual for countries to use quota administration to protect local industries from the increase in imported competition that followed free trade agreements.

“The agreement of new access in FTAs is great but it is the implementation around that access that is really crucial to whether it is usable or not.”

In the case of Canada up to 85% of quota was allocated to local processors who sourced subsidised raw milk from the country’s farmers and tended not to import dearer foreign dairy products.

Only 10% was for importers, who were also prevented from getting their hands on quota allocated to local processors but not used.

Canada’s chronic underutilisation of its CPTPP import quotas was reinforced by its Milk Class 7 milk payments system, which subsidised prices paid to local farmers and undercut imports and has long been a bugbear of the NZ industry and other exporters.

Friday, 7 August 2015

GST import threshold - a few principles

Since the government is looking set to lower the threshold for GST application at the border, or at least will be releasing a discussion paper on it next week, a few principles to keep in mind:

  • Were it possible to collect GST at the border seamlessly and at low cost, it should be applied at the border.
  • There are two classes of losses that obtain where GST is not collected at the border on lower valued imports. 
    • First, we have allocative inefficiency where slightly too many goods are imported relative to a first best. The 15% GST-based price difference may induce some extra imports at the margin, and this is inefficient.
    • Second, we have effects on the overall tax base. This is separate from the allocative efficiency issue. Suppose that each and every import currently undertaken is one that would also have happened if GST were applied at the border and that there is zero distortion. There remains erosion of the tax base in that world - the government is less able to rely on consumption taxes and consequently has to rely more heavily on other, potentially less efficient, taxes. The deadweight costs of having to rely on less efficient taxes will also here matter. 
      • That said, one thing that absolutely and emphatically does not matter is effects on the domestic company tax base or domestic income taxes. It potentially matters for thinking about fiscal incidence, but not for efficiency. Think of import leakages through online shopping here no differently than we think about import leakages when we buy cars that are built abroad. We do not, and should not, complain about lost company tax revenue where there isn't a domestic car manufacturing industry in New Zealand. Resources that would otherwise have been used making cars instead are put to other and better uses. Similarly, resources that would be put to use in domestic retail can be put to other better uses when consumers can more efficiently engage in direct-to-consumer imports from abroad. To count effects on domestic company tax base is to adopt mercantalism. 
  • In assessing where the threshold should be, we need, in the first instance, to think about the effects on efficiency. And that will depend entirely on how you set up the collection mechanism. If you can collect GST at the border in a way that imposes no greater cost than collecting GST on domestic purchases, then there's no allocative inefficiency tradeoff to be made and the optimal threshold is $0. As soon as the collection mechanism is costly, you start having tradeoffs. And recall that these costs are not just the costs on Customs or IRD for running the system: it's also the hassles that some systems would impose on those wishing to buy goods from abroad. When I say costs, it's inclusive of all of that. What's the tradeoff?
    • If the import threshold is set at some arbitrarily high level, you will induce way too much importation of high value, low shipping cost goods relative to a first best. That's an allocative inefficiency. 
    • If the import threshold is set at $0 and there are fixed costs in collecting GST at the border - say a fixed processing charge, or hassles for consumers, or hassles for foreign shippers, you will deter a lot of efficient imports. 
    • As you increase the threshold from $0, the allocative inefficiency from the fixed collection cost starts being trumped by the allocative inefficiency from too much higher valued import. At that point, you stop and set the threshold. What's the right threshold? I do not know, but it is endogenous to your collection mechanism.
And so we come to the absolute importance of picking a non-stupid, non-wishful-thinking GST collection mechanism.

Here are some things I believe count as wishful thinking. 
  • That foreign suppliers other than the very large ones would have any interest in registering with IRD to pay tax on goods shipped to New Zealand.
  • That foreign suppliers other than the very large ones, and perhaps not even the very large ones, would have any interest in putting a tax stamp on boxes being shipped to New Zealand indicating to Customs that tax had been paid on those shipments. 
  • That you can run this through the credit card companies, when the credit card companies cannot tell whether a good purchased abroad on a NZ credit card was for consumption in NZ or for consumption abroad.
  • That New Zealand shoppers would not bear any cost worth mentioning if their goods were held up at customs for days while waiting for them to get a note from Customs advising that the goods were there waiting for tax payment. 
Now I understand that there is talk about some big international agreement where shippers would register with some central agency and that outfit would make it relatively easy for those suppliers to ship goods to any foreign country. To the extent that that is successful, that counts against my first point. But consider too how many American retailers are already unwilling to ship goods abroad because of the hassles - that's why YouShop exists. That problem will not get better if we start thinking that foreign retailers are going to be happy to incur hassles in order to ship on to tiny tiny New Zealand.

Recall that there are a few classes of benefit from being able to access direct-to-consumer imports. Consumers doing the purchasing benefit from lower prices. Consumers continuing to purchase from domestic retailers very likely benefit from lower prices that come when domestic retailers have to compete with foreign websites. And, consumers get access to a broader range of niche goods that are not otherwise available in small markets. That last bit would be killed by proposals requiring foreign niche sellers to figure out how to get tax stamps to put on their packages. They'll just stop shipping the couple hundred items a year they might each ship to New Zealand. 

The least bad way I've thus far seen for imposing GST on goods shipped into New Zealand is the one Bronwyn Howell proposed. The domestic leg of shipment in New Zealand has to collect the GST and can compete to find the best way of doing it. It still needs careful assessment and somebody has to talk with the shippers about feasibility, but I can see its working where other mechanisms wouldn't. It doesn't require wishful thinking about credit card companies' willingness or ability to come to the table, or about foreign suppliers caring enough about the NZ tiny market relative to the hassles the NZ government thinks they're willing to bear for the privilege of selling to us. 

But we still have to sort out better ways of handling the customs and biosecurity extra levies that would absolutely kill low value imports if they were levied at the same time as GST on low-value goods. And we have to figure out what the domestic shippers would charge customers for having to act as tax collectors. I do not know whether the Howell proposal passes cost-benefit, but it seems the one most likely to do so if any of them will. To the extent that domestic retailers lobby for mechanisms that are more costly to implement, you might wonder whether they are really trying to impose a trade barrier.

Wednesday, 21 May 2014

Fixed costs in small countries, again

The Productivity Commission explains New Zealand's high prices:
The overall messages from this analysis are:
  • Modelling the determinants of non-tradables prices using the extended FG model works fairly well in general, and especially for a group of OECD-Eurostat countries. 
  • This supports the hypotheses that: 
    • Non-tradables prices are higher in association with higher values of capital and unskilled labour endowments, and trade deficits; 
    • Non-tradables prices are lower in association with higher values of skilled labour, and population;  
  • Tradable prices also tend to be higher where non-tradables prices are higher both because this raises the (non-tradable) input costs for tradables, and because high tradables prices are impacted by „trade impediments‟ and indirect taxes. 
  • The model suggests NZ‟s relatively small population and high tradables prices tend to raise its non-tradables prices relative to other countries. NZ‟s lower than average capital endowments should serve to counter-act these high prices, but modestly. (NZ has the 28th highest ranked capital endowment, and 25th highest capital/labour ratio, out of 43 countries). 
  • For labour endowments, taking a ratio of skilled labour (differences) to population (differences), NZ is ranked 29th out of the 43 OECD-Eurostat countries in this ratio, so that its relatively low skilled labour per capita also serves to raise its service prices.
  • NZ's relatively high price of non-tradables is estimated to add around 40% to the domestic consumer price of tradables, compared to border or factory gate prices. This is also around the OECD-Eurostat average cost share. 
  • However, after accounting for this 'cost share of non-tradables' contribution, NZ's tradables prices remain fairly high by international standards. A "good candidate" to explain this are the transaction costs associated with NZ‟s distance from markets. Though we have not examined direct evidence on this here, numerous other studies have suggested the importance of such factors; see, for example, McCann (2003, 2009). 
  • Based on "adjusted" tradables prices that removes the "cost share of non-tradables" element, NZ's tradables prices are around 6th highest in the 43 country OECD-Eurostat sample – behind such countries as Iceland, Norway and Japan (see Figure 6). These are also countries relatively distant from many of their key markets. (For Japan at least, other protectionist measures may also be relevant). However, Australia is ranked 19th out of 43 countries in its adjusted tradables price, suggesting that to the extent that there are "disadvantages of distance", Australia manages partially to avoid or overcome these.
  • As Figure 6 shows, NZ is like a number of other small countries with a high adjusted tradables prices (e.g. Cyprus, Malta, Denmark, Finland, Israel, in addition to the "small and distant" economies of Iceland and Norway). This suggests that size or other characteristics of domestic markets/populations may be important in ways not already accounted for by the FG model's variables.
Labour has been exercised lately by the high costs of an increasing population: new migrants come in and bid up the price of housing where housing supply cannot expand to meet increased demand. They might worry instead about the longer-term costs of being small if they block migration. We can't do much about distance. But we can get bigger.

Other points worth thinking about:
  • Our relatively high cost of alcohol and tobacco is particularly noted by the Commission; this does run contrary to the usual story we're told about alcohol being too cheap in New Zealand.
  • I wonder whether results would be affected much by taking PriceSpy import prices instead of domestic landed prices for some consumer goods. How much does PriceSpy, and related services, constrain domestic prices?
  • Gemmell's prior work showed footwear and clothing to be expensive here. I note that footwear still here attracts a 10% tariff. We could fix part of our stupid-high-prices problem by getting rid of the tariff that helps make one of those price categories more expensive than it needs to be. Sir Roger tried back in 2010; National vetoed the change.