The Wall Street Journal had an excellent two-parter on Mark Carney's handling of a rather difficult situation: a century-long ally and decades-long free-trade partner threatening to invade and annex your territory, and threatening to nullify the treaty that settled the border.
Part One (ungated) goes through Europe's slow realisation of the nature of the Trump administration.
Part Two (ungated) explains how Carney helped Europe realise the situation that we are all now in.
His prescription in large part would lay in Europe, where Carney, a former Bank of England governor, had made his past and now saw Canada’s future. The Canadian banker who never before held elected office would emerge as an unexpected central figure in a high-stakes project to reshape the economic and military community known as the West.
Since World War II the alliance had worked like a wheel: The U.S. as the indispensable hub and the rest as spokes. Carney argued that Canada and Europe would have to build an alternative model, a “dense web of connections” that wouldn’t overly depend on any single country. His approach contrasted to that of another influential leader, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who was encouraging Europe to double down on its relationship with Trump—whatever it took to keep America from abandoning the alliance.
They represented opposing poles of a years-old debate coming to a boil in Europe, with the U.K., like Rutte, betting heavily on its special relationship with Washington. France, conversely, was eager to build up Europe’s own sovereign defense base and technology, from quantum computing to AI systems held outside America. Carney would try to sway the outcome, without provoking the superpower that imports three-quarters of Canada’s goods.
In effect, a push to make Canada America’s 51st state had lighted a fuse of unintended consequences that would play out far beyond North America, as overseas allies asked themselves whether the U.S.-led alliance could truly last.
The Wall Street Journal spoke to heads of government, their ministers and top aides to reconstruct the closed-door meetings where the alliance began to splinter. The Journal was able to review detailed notes taken by some participants. This is the second in a two-part series revealing the contents of deliberations among America’s allies over how they might salvage their alliance—or prepare for its unraveling.
Matt Gurney and Jen Gerson's discussion at The Line is also worthwhile.
It does make me a bit nervous about this, from the Politik newsletter:
Last year’s ASEAN Summit underscored the enduring limitations of ASEAN’s collective approach to the South China Sea.
Most member states issued cautious statements and avoided directly addressing recent developments, including China’s declaration of a nature reserve at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, its deployment of buoys, and its continued ramming and use of water cannons against Philippine vessels.
As the 2025 chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reiterated that disputes should be resolved within ASEAN and warned that the involvement of “outside forces” would only heighten tensions.
While Philippine President Marcos publicly agreed with this, his administration continues to pursue partnerships beyond the bloc to deter further Chinese escalation at sea.
Those partnerships are led by the United States.
Thus, New Zealand had a choice: did it side with ASEAN or the US? Clearly, it sided with the US.
The move appears to be part of an orchestrated effort by New Zealand to strengthen its alliances with countries that are seeking to build up their resistance to China.
